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521 
W(H)ITHER THE TAX GAP? 
James Alm & Jay A. Soled
*
 
For decades, policy makers and politicians have railed against the “tax gap,” or the 
difference between what taxpayers are legally obligated to pay in taxes and what they 
actually pay in taxes. To close the gap, Congress has instituted numerous reforms with 
varying degrees of success. Notwithstanding these efforts, the tax gap has largely remained 
intact, and, if anything, it has gradually grown over the last several decades. 
However, the tax gap may well begin to diminish in size (or “wither” away), if not 
immediately then over time. Three developments will help narrow the tax gap’s size. First, 
the ubiquity of credit cards, debit cards, and smartphone payment apps has purged cash—the 
erstwhile driving engine of the tax gap—from its use in many economic transactions. 
Second, the availability of third-party sources of information, combined with the universal 
use of computerization to store, access, and analyze information, has significantly curtailed a 
taxpayer’s ability to hide income here in the United States or overseas. Third, broad 
economic trends such as concentration and globalization have generated a workforce 
dynamic in which taxpayers generally are employed by large business enterprises (where 
individual tax compliance is fairly high) rather than in traditional mom-and-pop businesses 
(where individual tax compliance is typically low). 
The implications associated with a lower tax gap are vast. Even beyond the usual 
considerations associated with greater tax compliance (e.g., increased revenues, reduced 
noncompliance-induced inefficiencies, and improved horizontal and vertical equity of tax 
burdens), taxpayers would experience a shift in the labor market and an adjustment in the 
prices paid for consumer goods and services. Also, rather than conducting audits and 
deterring noncompliance, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would be able to dedicate a 
greater share of its limited resources to other pressing agenda items, such as assisting 
taxpayers in their compliance endeavors. 
There are, of course, other countervailing economic trends that may subvert the forces 
that will act to reduce the tax gap, so its future path remains highly uncertain (and hence the 
alternative use of “whither”). Also, for a whole host of reasons, especially reductions in IRS 
funding, the tax gap will not be closed anytime soon. Nevertheless, the tide against tax 
noncompliance may finally be turning. 
 
                                                     
* James Alm is the chairman of the Department of Economics at Tulane University, and Jay A. 
Soled is a business professor at Rutgers Business School. Both authors have written and lectured 
about ways to close the tax gap. Both received many helpful comments from the participants of the 
New York University Tax Colloquium in April 2016 (especially Dan Shaviro and Chris Sanchirico); 
from the participants at the Tax Administration Research Centre (TARC) 4th Annual Workshop at 
the University of Exeter in Exeter, UK in April 2016 (especially Gareth Myles, Nina Olson, and 
Norman Gemmell); and from the participants at the European University Institute Conference 
“Willing to Pay? History, Experiments, and Tax Compliance” in Florence, Italy in May 2016 
(especially Sven Steinmo, Alan Plumley, Stefano Pisani, Mike Hawkins, and Lennart Wittberg). 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is much discussion in the popular media and academic presses 
regarding the severity of the “tax gap,”1 defined as the difference 
between what taxpayers actually pay in taxes in a timely manner and 
what they should pay if they fully comply with the tax laws.
2
 The tax 
                                                     
1. Tax gap articles and reports abound. For a smattering of such literature, see generally JAMES 
M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42739, TAX GAP, TAX COMPLIANCE, AND PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION IN THE 112TH CONGRESS (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42739.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HMF2-VCSJ]; JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL338882, TAX 
GAP AND TAX ENFORCEMENT (2007), http://research.policyarchive.org/3143_Previous_Version 
_2011-02-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/KBF2-EFBE]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY 
COMPLIANCE (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_report_final_080207_linked.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KEQ2-DWXP] [hereinafter 2007 TAX GAP STUDY]; OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP (2006), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/comprehensive_strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6C8-NREJ]; 
Heather Bennett, IRS Must Get Grip on Tax Gap, Taxpayer Advocate Says, 106 TAX NOTES 531 
(2005); Dustin Stamper, Everson Pledges to Narrow Growing Tax Gap, 110 TAX NOTES 807 
(2006); George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses the Tax Gap, 107 TAX NOTES 1449 (2005). 
2. See generally Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, IRS’s Comprehensive Approach to 
Compliance Measurement, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 689 (2003); Mark J. Mazur & Alan H. Plumley, 
Understanding the Tax Gap, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 569 (2007); Nina E. Olson, Minding the Gap: A Ten-
Step Program for Better Tax Compliance, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7 (2009); Eric Toder, What Is 
the Tax Gap?, 117 TAX NOTES 367 (2007). 
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gap was most recently estimated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
for the average of tax years 2008 to 2010 to be $458 billion annually, 
with an associated “voluntary compliance rate” (VCR) (or taxes paid 
relative to total taxes legally due) of 81.7%.
3
 This is a stunning dollar 
amount. Indeed, were the IRS to completely close this gap, the agency 
would come close to eliminating the nation’s annual federal government 
budget deficit.
4
 
Over time and in absolute dollar amounts, the tax gap’s size has 
progressively grown. The first IRS estimates of the tax gap were for 
1973 and indicated a gross individual and corporate income tax gap of 
$28 billion to $32 billion and a VCR of about 84%.
5
 Subsequent 
estimates throughout the 1970s and 1980s indicated a steady growth in 
the tax gap with a fairly constant VCR between 82% to 84%.
6
 By the 
time the IRS released updated estimates for 1992 for the individual 
income tax, the gross tax gap had increased to over $93 billion.
7
 Since 
then, the tax gap has continued to grow to where it is today (i.e., $458 
billion).
8
 The general sentiment among most observers is that this trend 
will likely continue and perhaps even worsen.
9
 
However, the predictions of a persistent and steadily growing tax gap, 
both in absolute and relative magnitudes, are in all likelihood wrong. 
Instead, it seems far more probable that the tax gap will diminish in size 
                                                     
3. See Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2008-2010, IRS Statement on the Tax Gap Update, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/the-tax-gap [https://perma.cc/HCP9-H6H2] 
(last updated Apr. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Tax Gap Estimates]. For earlier year’s estimates, see Press 
Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Releases New Tax Gap Estimates; Compliance Rates Remain 
Statistically Unchanged from Previous Study (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-12-
004.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD5H-8EWV]. 
4. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2016 TO 2026 (2016), 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51129 [https://perma.cc/VT9Q-79JP] (indicating that the 2015 FY 
deficit for the federal government was $439 billion and rose to $544 billion in FY 2016 and 
projecting that the deficit will increase over the next decade). 
5. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 7285, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: GROSS TAX 
GAP ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS FOR 1973-1992 (1988). 
6. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 1415, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR 1985, 1988, AND 1992, at 5 (1996), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/p141596.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7QR-KKPN]; Jonathan Skinner & 
Joel Slemrod, An Economic Perspective on Tax Evasion, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 345, 345 (1985) 
(estimating a $90 billion tax gap for 1981). 
7. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 6, at v. 
8. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 4. See infra Appendix, Figure 1 for a depiction of the 
tax gap magnitudes and the VCR over the last four decades. 
9. See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the 
Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 574 (2006) (“This shortfall—the so-called tax 
gap—is not only large, but has more than tripled over the past two decades and continues to 
grow.”). 
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in the future; that is, the tax gap may well “wither” away in size over the 
coming years. This prediction is based upon the following three 
significant trends. First, the use of credit cards, debit cards, and 
smartphone payment apps has become much more prevalent in 
economic commerce. This manner of conducting economic transactions 
creates an electronic (and traceable) trail of commerce and 
simultaneously subverts the driving engine behind many tax evasion 
activities, namely, the use of cash.
10
 Second, governments around the 
world, including the United States, have added new third-party 
compliance measures that take advantage of computer advances to 
monitor taxpayer economic activities so that the opportunity for 
taxpayers to pay less than they owe by mistake or by subterfuge has 
been and will continue to be dramatically reduced.
11
 Third, as business 
enterprises have grown in magnitude—in many instances eradicating 
small businesses—there is more direct and indirect tax compliance 
oversight.
12
 
Taxpayers can nevertheless be cagey and particularly tenacious in 
their determination to defeat their tax obligations—in some cases, 
legitimately, and in other cases, illegitimately. Therefore, in order to 
make full disclosure, it is necessary to point out and analyze possible 
countervailing tendencies that make the future path of the tax gap highly 
uncertain (and hence the title choice of “W(h)ither the Tax Gap?”). 
This analysis proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the 
tax gap. Part II details each of the trends that, together, should cause the 
tax gap to narrow. Part III discusses the possible implications associated 
with a narrower tax gap. Part IV presents the countertrends that make the 
evolution of the tax gap uncertain. The final Part concludes. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TAX GAP 
At the outset, it is important to differentiate tax avoidance from tax 
evasion. Taxpayers may participate in legal “tax avoidance” activities, 
such as income splitting, postponement of taxes, and tax arbitrage across 
income that faces different tax treatment, all of which minimizes one’s 
tax liability.
13
 In contrast, the phrase “tax evasion” refers to illegal and 
intentional actions taken by taxpayers to circumvent their legally due tax 
                                                     
10. See supra section III.A. 
11. See supra section III.B. 
12. See supra section III.C. 
13. Tax Avoidance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1500 (8th ed. 2004). 
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obligations
14
 by underreporting incomes, overstating deductions, 
exemptions, or credits, failing to file appropriate tax returns, and even 
engaging in barter. Most often these actions are viewed through the lens 
of the individual income tax, but these types of actions can clearly be 
taken to mitigate other forms of taxation.
15
 It is the existence of tax 
evasion, not tax avoidance, that creates what commentators term the “tax 
gap.”16 
The IRS defines the tax gap as the amount of tax liability legally 
incurred by taxpayers that is not paid in a timely manner. More 
precisely, the tax gap is the difference between tax revenues actually 
collected in any given year and the amount that should be collected if 
taxpayers fully and timely complied with the tax laws.
17
 In the most 
recent 2008–2010 estimates from the IRS, the tax gap consists of three 
separate components: (1) the “nonfiling gap” (i.e., taxes not paid by 
individuals who do not file a return at all or, alternatively, who file after 
the due date), (2) the “underreporting gap” (i.e., taxes not paid by 
taxpayers who file a return but misreport their true tax liability), and (3) 
the “underpayment gap” (i.e., taxes reported on filed tax returns that are 
not timely paid by taxpayers).
18
 
                                                     
14. Tax Evasion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1501 (8th ed. 2004). 
15. For example, regarding the corporate income tax, firms can underreport income, overstate 
deductions, or fail to file tax returns, just as individuals do in the realm of the individual income tax. 
See, e.g., Alexia Fernández Campbell, The Cost of Corporate Tax Avoidance, ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/corporate-tax-avoidance/478293/ [https:// 
perma.cc/D8HN-DUSW]. Similarly, sales taxes present numerous opportunities for evasion. See, 
e.g., Matthew N. Murray, Sales Tax Compliance and Audit Selection, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 515 (1995). 
Individuals can attempt to evade a jurisdiction’s sales taxes on specific commodities by purchasing 
them in other neighboring areas and then consuming them in the relevant jurisdiction without 
paying the required use tax, and individuals can simply evade taxes on intangible services. See 
Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Zappers: Technology-Assisted Tax Fraud, SSUTA, and the 
Encryption Solutions, 61 TAX LAW. 1075 (2008). A broad-based retail sales tax is certain to include 
significant exemptions (e.g., food, health, education, and services), thereby creating individual and 
firm incentives for evasion. Murray, supra. For a value-added tax, firms can present fraudulent 
invoices that allow them to understate their tax liabilities, or they can simply fail to register 
(especially if their value-added tax is high, as is the case with service providers); individuals may 
even seek to register as firms to disguise their own personal consumption of purchased inputs. 
Michael Keen & Stephen Smith, VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know and What Can Be 
Done?, 109 NAT’L TAX J. 861 (2006). 
16. See supra notes 1–2. 
17. See supra notes 1–2. 
18. See Rosemary D. Marcuss, Understanding Compliance: What’s the Tax Gap Got to Do with 
It?, 133 TAX NOTES 887, 892 (2011); George K. Yin, Principles and Practices to Enhance 
Compliance and Enforcement of the Personal Income Tax, 31 VA. TAX REV. 381 (2012). 
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As a compendium of these three components, the IRS has published 
what it refers to as the Tax Gap Map,
19
 which graphically highlights the 
extent to which each of the components contributed to the overall tax 
gap in 2008–2010. Furthermore, the map breaks down each component 
by type of tax (i.e., individual income tax, corporate income tax, 
employment tax, estate tax, and excise tax) to illustrate the specific types 
of taxes that are nonfiled, underreported, or underpaid. 
The map shows that, by far, the largest component of the 2008–2010 
tax gap was the underreporting gap (equal to $387 billion), which 
comprised 84.5% of the entire tax gap. The largest contributor to the 
underreporting gap was underreporting of the individual income tax 
(equal to $264 billion). The map also indicates that the largest 
contributor to underreported individual income tax was unreported 
business income (equal to $125 billion).
20
 
While all tax gap estimates appear to be precise, the accuracy of these 
dollar estimates is subject to much uncertainty.
21
 Consider the particular 
challenges associated with estimating the underreporting gap: tax 
evasion is illegal, and taxpayers have strong incentives to conceal their 
cheating, particularly given financial and other penalties that are 
imposed on those who are found purposefully shortchanging their taxes. 
The approach that the IRS historically has used to compute the 
underreporting gap was based largely upon what is termed the “direct” 
measurement of evasion via actual audits of individual returns.
22
 For 
example, from 1963 to 1988, the IRS conducted detailed line-by-line 
audits of a stratified random sample of roughly 50,000 individual tax 
returns on a three-year cycle via its Taxpayer Compliance Measurement 
Program (TCMP).
23
 These audits yielded an IRS estimate of the 
taxpayer’s “true” income, which the agency could then compare to 
                                                     
19. See infra Appendix, Figure 2; Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 3. 
20. Over time, these statistics have generally remained the same. See supra notes 5–6. 
21. See, e.g., Toder, supra note 2, at 372 (“Nonetheless, a large amount of uncertainty must be 
assigned to the current tax gap estimate.”). See generally A Closer Look at the Size and Sources of 
the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation & IRS Oversight of the S. Comm. on Fin., 
109th Cong. 8 (2006) (statement of J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/congress/congress_07262006.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
MZH4-73LR]. 
22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-753, TAX COMPLIANCE: BETTER 
COMPLIANCE DATA AND LONG-TERM GOALS WOULD SUPPORT A MORE STRATEGIC IRS 
APPROACH TO REDUCING THE TAX GAP (2005), http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247137.html 
[https://perma.cc/E6BZ-7BSS]. 
23. Id. (“TCMP started with tax year 1963 and examined individual returns most frequently—
generally every 3 years—through tax year 1988. IRS contacted all taxpayers selected for TCMP 
studies.”). 
04 - Alm & Soled.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/2017  1:30 PM 
2017] W(H)ITHER THE TAX GAP? 527 
 
“actual” reported items. The TCMP has now been replaced by the 
National Research Program (NRP),
24
 which examines roughly 46,000 
randomly selected individual returns for selected years (which, to date, 
include 2001 and 2006), only some of which were subject to line-by-line 
audits.
25
 It is these NRP data that have been used for the more recent IRS 
estimates of the tax gap.
26
 
With respect to the remaining two components of the tax gap, or the 
underpayment gap and the nonfiling gap, the difficulty of measurement 
varies, and the IRS uses different procedures. It is relatively easy to 
compute the underpayment gap, which is simply the difference between 
how much tax is reported by taxpayers and how much they actually pay 
on time.
27
 It is far more challenging to estimate the nonfiling gap, which 
results from comparing the overall tax-filing population with those who 
actually file and estimating the tax that nonfilers would owe less the tax 
that they may have paid via source withholding; the IRS makes nonfiling 
gap estimates using its own data and that supplied by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.
28
 
For decades, the tax gap has plagued the nation’s finances. Its 
presence has a variety of harmful economic effects. The most obvious 
impact is that it contributes to larger federal government budget deficits, 
forcing either spending cuts or tax increases. The reduction in tax 
collections affects the taxes that compliant taxpayers face and the public 
services that they receive. The tax gap also has more subtle effects 
beyond these revenue losses. For example, when taxpayers alter their 
behavior to cheat on their taxes, such as in their choices of hours to 
work, occupations to enter, and investments to undertake, they create 
misallocations in resource use that affect the economy.
29
 Furthermore, 
                                                     
24. Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Research Program: Measuring Taxpayer 
Compliance Comprehensively, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255 (2003). 
25. See Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. 
REV. 161, 167 (2008) (“Like the TCMP, the NRP selects returns randomly, but it reviews even 
fewer returns and does so with less intensity than the TCMP” (i.e., most of the returns are not 
reviewed line-by-line and each item audited does not require substantiation).). 
26. Id. 
27. The IRS estimates the underpayment gap using internal IRS tabulations. See INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., supra note 5. 
28. See 2007 TAX GAP STUDY, supra note 1. 
29. For attempts to estimate these efficiency effects, see generally James Alm, The Welfare Cost 
of the Underground Economy, 24 ECON. INQUIRY 243 (1985); James Alm & Robert Buckley, Are 
Government Revenues from Financial Repression Worth the Costs?, 26 PUB. FIN. REV. 187 (1998); 
Jonathan R. Kesselman, Income Tax Evasion: An Intersectoral Analysis, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 137 
(1989). For a more recent effort to estimate these efficiency effects, see James Alm, Analyzing and 
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the tax gap alters the distribution of income in arbitrary, unpredictable, 
and unfair ways since some taxpayers are better able to exploit the tax 
system than others.
30
 The tax gap may also contribute to feelings of 
unjust treatment and disrespect for the law,
31
 requiring the government 
to expend resources to detect noncompliance, to measure its magnitude, 
and to penalize its perpetrators. It even affects the accuracy of 
macroeconomic statistics since the presence of large amounts of tax 
evasion means that official measures of output likely omit much 
economic activity.
32
 More broadly, it is not possible to understand the 
true impact of taxation without recognizing the existence and the effects 
of the tax gap. 
To date, the U.S. tax gap has proven largely resistant to efforts to 
reduce its size, and the experience of other countries around the world is 
                                                     
Reforming Tunisia’s Tax System, in COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPE AND THE 
MENA REGION (M. Mustafa Erdogdu ed., 2016). 
30. For a recent attempt to estimate these distributional effects, see Andrew Johns & Joel 
Slemrod, The Distribution of Income Tax Noncompliance, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 397 (2010). They find 
that the ratio of misreported income to true income generally rises with true income (so that higher 
income individuals misreport income at a higher rate than lower income individuals), but also that 
the ratio of misreported taxes to true taxes tends to fall with true income (so that the lower income 
individuals misreport taxes at a higher rate than higher income individuals). Id. at 397. Note that 
these estimates ignore any market adjustments of product or factor prices that may occur due to the 
tax gap, as discussed in detail later. 
31. In the analysis of tax evasion behavior, there are many approaches that attempt to explain 
behavior by incorporating various related notions of unjust treatment and disrespect for the law, 
most of which have their origins in the psychology of taxation. For example, some theorists suggest 
that taxpayer “trust” in government affects compliance behavior. James Alm & Benno Torgler, Do 
Ethics Matter? Tax Compliance and Morality, 101 J. BUS. ETHICS 635, 636 (2011). Others adopt a 
slightly different terminology and explore the interaction between enforcement effort (“power”) and 
facilitation (“trust”) on the part of the tax authority. Erich Kirchler, Erik Hoelzl & Ingrid Wahl, 
Enforced Versus Voluntary Tax Compliance: The “Slippery Slope” Framework, 29 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 210, 211 (2008). Still others suggest that people may choose to comply willingly 
(“committed compliance”) or unwillingly (“capitulative compliance”), they may take full advantage 
of the law in minimizing their taxes (“creative compliance”), or they may choose noncompliance; 
depending upon these choices, appropriate enforcement policies vary. Doreen McBarnet, When 
Compliance Is Not the Solution but the Problem: From Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude, in 
TAXING DEMOCRACY: UNDERSTANDING TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 229 (Valerie Braithwaite 
ed., 2003); see also DOREEN MCBARNET, CRIME, COMPLIANCE AND CONTROL (2004). Finally, 
others argue that individuals are motivated either by “deference” or “defiance” motives and that 
enforcement actions should be tailored to reflect these different motivations. VALERIE 
BRAITHWAITE, DEFIANCE IN TAXATION AND GOVERNANCE: RESISTING AND DISMISSING 
AUTHORITY IN A DEMOCRACY 22, 26 (2009). 
32. See Friedrich Schneider & Dominik H. Enste, Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and 
Consequences, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 77 (2000).  
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similar.
33
 Even so, there are emerging forces that seem likely to reduce 
the tax gap in future years. In the next Part, these trends are discussed. 
II. TRENDS THAT WILL NARROW THE TAX GAP 
There are many commentators and politicians who contend that 
taxpayer noncompliance is so embedded in the nation’s fabric that it is 
virtually impossible to reverse.
34
 In other words, it is said, given the 
economic incentives for cheating, those taxpayers who purposefully 
shortchange the government are not apt to undergo a metamorphosis 
anytime soon and start paying their legally due taxes. Furthermore, the 
IRS lacks the resources not only to detect noncompliance in a 
comprehensive fashion but also to prosecute the agency’s claims to the 
full extent of the law;
35
 even if the IRS were inclined and able to do so, 
the political backlash would be massive and negative.
36
 As a result, 
many believe that the tax gap will persist and even grow over time.
37
 
Those taxpayers who act unscrupulously and whose actions are met with 
impunity are likely to continue in their behavior, and other taxpayers 
who learn of these derelictions may start to behave in a similarly 
noncompliant way.
38
 
                                                     
33. See Richard Murphy, Closing the European Tax Gap, TAX RESEARCH LLP (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/sites/default/files/120229_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en.p
df [https://perma.cc/5CLB-UWPC] (explaining the severity of the European tax gap and why it is so 
challenging to close). 
34. See Closing the Tax Gap Without Creating Burdens for Small Businesses: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Small Business, 110th Cong. (2007); Deconstructing the Tax Code: Uncollected Taxes 
and Issues of Transparency: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Federal Financial Management, 
Government Information, and Internal Security of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006).  
35. See, e.g., Suzanne Woolley, 2015 Is the Best Year Yet to Cheat on Your Taxes, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-15/2015-is-the-best-year-yet-
to-cheat-on-your-taxes [https://perma.cc/F6JD-59FW] (explaining that IRS budget cuts means that 
the agency cannot meaningfully enforce the Code). 
36. See, e.g., Republicans Slam IRS Targeting of Tea Party as ‘Chilling,’ A Form of Intimidation, 
FOX NEWS (May 12, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/05/12/rogers-irs-targeting-tea-
party-and-other-political-groups-intimidation.html [https://perma.cc/M2QT-PJJM]. 
37. See Raskolnikov, supra note 9. 
38. See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Economics of Strong Reciprocity, in MORAL 
SENTIMENTS & MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 
167 (2005) (“[I]f people believe that cheating on taxes, corruption, or abuses of the welfare state are 
widespread, they themselves are more likely to cheat on taxes, take bribes, or abuse welfare state 
institutions.”); Benno Torgler, Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax 
Compliance in Experiments, 16 J. ECON. SURV. 657, 663–66 (2002) (describing how group 
dynamics may contribute to tax noncompliance). 
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However, notwithstanding these points, there are three external forces 
that should cause the tax gap to narrow over time: (A) the rise of 
electronic commerce, (B) information availability via computerization, 
and (C) a shifting labor force. 
A. The Rise of Electronic Currency 
The use of physical currency to transact commerce has a long history, 
dating back at least four millennia.
39
 Its use constitutes a tremendous 
advancement from the economic system of barter that predated it.
40
 
Notwithstanding the virtues of physical currency to facilitate business 
transactions, currency use suffers from a fundamental flaw from a tax 
compliance perspective: it is virtually impossible to trace. As such, 
currency has been one of the underground economy’s cornerstones.41 
Indeed, the magnitude of its use is one of the main metrics by which the 
size of the underground economy is often estimated.
42
 
However, over the course of the last several decades, the use of 
electronic currency in commerce has experienced a meteoric rise, 
                                                     
39. See Money, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 249–53 (William 
A. Darity Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
40. See Claire Priest, Currency Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New England, 110 
YALE L.J. 1303, 1318 (2001) (“Pure barter creates essentially two impediments to economic activity 
that have been emphasized in the economic literature: the need for a ‘double coincidence of wants,’ 
and information problems associated with an economy without money prices.”).  
41. See Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, 117 TAX 
NOTES 506, 506 (2007) (describing how those who participate in the cash economy (e.g., 
“comprised of non-franchise retail or restaurants, service providers, general contractors and similar 
businesses throughout the economy”) generally do not pay tax or pay very little tax); Susan Cleary 
Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 37, 37–38 (2009) (“Underpayment of tax on business income is commonly attributed to 
the receipt of cash.”). Note that in an attempt to reduce illicit activities, including tax cheating, 
Europe has decided to scrap the 500 Euro bill. Alanna Petroff, 500 Euro Bill Is Being Killed Off, 
CNN: MONEY (May 4, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/04/news/500-euro-bill-banknote-ecb/ 
[https://perma.cc/E8AK-T2EL]. 
42. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER & DOMINIK H. ENSTE, THE SHADOW ECONOMY—AN 
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY (2002). More recently, see James Alm & Abel Embaye, Using Panel 
Methods to Estimate Shadow Economies Around the World, 1984–1986, 41 PUB. FIN. REV. 510 
(2013). There are, in fact, various definitions of the “underground economy,” also referred to as the 
“shadow economy,” the “informal economy,” and the “black economy,” among other monikers. 
One definition is that the underground economy includes all economic activities that contribute to 
the officially calculated gross national (or domestic) product but that are not included in these 
accounts. Relatedly, the underground economy could be defined as all market-based but unreported 
income from the production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or barter transactions, 
that would normally be taxable if they were reported to the tax authorities. Perhaps the most widely 
accepted definition is that the shadow economy includes all market-based goods and services (legal 
or illegal) that escape inclusion in official accounts. 
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supplanting physical currency use. Electronic commerce comes in 
essentially three forms: credit cards, debit cards, and smartphone 
payment applications. These three commerce modes are of very recent 
vintage. In the mid-twentieth century, credit cards were introduced,
43
 
followed soon thereafter by the introduction of debit cards
44
 and, just in 
the last decade, by smartphone payment applications.
45
 
The emergence of electronic currency as a means of payment strongly 
supports the proposition that the widespread use of cash to finance 
transactions may be coming to an end.
46
 In the area of consumer 
                                                     
43. See Mary Bellis, Who Invented Credit Cards?, ABOUT (Mar. 17, 2015), 
http://inventors.about.com/od/cstartinventions/a/credit_cards.htm [https://perma.cc/6D9K-XNML] 
(“The inventor of the first bank issued credit card was John Biggins of the Flatbush National Bank 
of Brooklyn in New York. In 1946, Biggins invented the ‘Charge-It’ program between bank 
customers and local merchants. Merchants could deposit sales slips into the bank and the bank 
billed the customer who used the card.”). 
44. See Eric Tilden, A Detailed History of Debit Cards, EHOW, 
http://www.ehow.com/about_5462528_detailed-history-debit-cards.html [https://perma.cc/4YVF-
UMGT] (“The First National Bank of Seattle issued the first debit card to business executives with 
large savings accounts in 1978. These cards acted like a check signature or a guarantee card, where 
the bank promised the funds would cover the transaction without the customer needing a check to 
complete the transaction.”). 
45. See A Cash Call, ECONOMIST (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/8697424 
[https://perma.cc/63HC-CDVM] (“Mobile phones are becoming an increasingly popular way to 
make all sorts of payments.”). In some countries, such as Kenya, electronic commerce is essentially 
replacing cash. See, e.g., Tom Standage, Why Does Kenya Lead the World in Mobile Money?, 
ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/ 
economist-explains-18 [https://perma.cc/A294-4GWH] (“Launched in 2007 by Safaricom, the 
country’s largest mobile-network operator, it is now used by over 17 [million] Kenyans, equivalent 
to more than two-thirds of the adult population; around 25% of the country’s gross national product 
flows through it. M-PESA lets people transfer cash using their phones, and is by far the most 
successful scheme of its type on earth.”). For an interactive timeline of M-PESA, see Celebrating 
10 Years of Changing Lives, SAFARICOM LTD., https://www.safaricom.co.ke/mpesa_ 
timeline/timeline.html [https://perma.cc/B99M-WWFL]. 
46. See Catherine New, Cash Dying as Credit Card Payments Predicted to Grow in Volume, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/credit-card-
payments-growth_n_1575417.html [https://perma.cc/Z7BD-JTQH] (“What was once the most 
secure way to pay for things—hard cash—is increasingly becoming currency non grata in wallets 
and checkouts across the country. Airlines won’t take it for in-flight snacks and a growing number 
of stores and restaurants like Standard Market, a new neighborhood market in Chicago, won’t 
accept it. It’s plastic or bust for consumers who want to do a transaction in these card-only places. 
Meanwhile, plastic cards purchases comprised 66 percent of all in-person sales, with nearly half of 
them, or 31 percent, made with debit cards, according to [Javelin Strategy & Research, a marketing 
research firm]. Last year shoppers used credit cards for 29 percent of point-of-sale purchases; 
Javelin expects that number to rise to 33 percent by 2017. Shoppers deployed gift cards and prepaid 
cards for 6 percent of purchases made with plastic last year. A mere 7 percent of transactions 
involved use of a paper check, with such transactions projected to drop further in the next few 
years.”). See generally John Heggestuen, Cash Is Fading, and Checks Are Dying as Smartphones 
and Tablets Change the Way We Pay, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www. 
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purchases, there are comprehensive reports prepared by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston detailing cash usage;
47
 in its 2012 report (the 
most recent year for which data are available), there are two stunning 
statistics. First, credit and charge card payments constituted 21.6% of all 
purchases, the highest level ever recorded.
48
 Second, “[t]he average 
stock of cash carried [by an individual] for transactions fell more than 30 
percent in real terms since the mid-1980s (from $112 to $79) and the 
typical amount of a cash withdrawal [by an individual from banks] fell 
nearly 50 percent (from $261 to $132).”49 
The implications for the underground economy of this decline in cash 
use are vast.
50
 The use of electronic means of payment will almost 
certainly reduce the extent of the underground economy because 
individuals who once routinely hid their transactions via cash will now 
be stripped of this luxury. Every electronic payment leaves an indelible 
mark; these “marks” enable IRS auditors to accurately access income 
flows.
51
 To minimize their taxable income (e.g., the underreporting gap), 
taxpayers may continue to overstate their deductions and expenses (for 
which auditors can demand substantiation), but their income can no 
longer be readily hidden or camouflaged. 
Academics have often called for the elimination or curtailment of the 
use of physical currency in order to reduce tax evasion.
52
 To date, 
                                                     
businessinsider.com/cash-is-fading-and-checks-are-dying-as-smartphones-and-tablets-change-the-
way-we-pay-2014-8 [https://perma.cc/3B3U-P2FW]. 
47. See SCOTT SCHUH & JOANNA STAVINS, NO. 14-1, FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, THE 2011 
AND 2012 SURVEYS OF CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE (Sept. 29, 2014), 
https://www.bostonfed.org/economic/rdr/2014/rdr1401.pdf [https://perma.cc/X98D-6E27]. 
48. Id. at 5. 
49. See Tamás Briglevics & Scott Schuh, U.S. Consumer Demand for Cash in the Era of Low 
Interest Rates and Electronic Payments 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 13-23, 
2013), http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp/wp2013/wp1323.pdf [https://perma.cc/C98W-
CNBC]. 
50. Even at the local coffee store, consumers are forgoing the use of cash. See, e.g., Jeff Sommer, 
Cheap Coffee and the Starbucks Premium, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2015, at B6 (Starbucks’s chief 
executive reports that “mobile payments now represent 20 percent of all in-store transactions in our 
U.S. stores, more than double the figure from only two years ago.”). 
51. See, e.g., Connie Prater, What Electronic Payments Reveal About You to Lenders, 
CREDITCARDS.COM (Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-
purchase-privacy-1282.php [https://perma.cc/Q7WG-45JV] (“In exchange for the convenience of 
using plastic, you also give up something some people hold dear—privacy.”). 
52. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Kahn & Gregg Polsky, The End of Cash, the Income Tax, and the Next 
100 Years, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 159 (2013). There are also increasing calls to eliminate high 
denomination currency notes on the basis that such notes are the main means of financing illegal 
transactions. See, e.g., Kenneth Rogoff, Costs and Benefits to Phasing Out Paper Currency, NBER 
MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL CONFERENCE (2014), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/rogoff/files/ 
c13431.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9HT-ZTJ6]; Lawrence Summers, Killing This “Bin Laden” Is a 
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politicians have yet to heed these calls for reform. For the foreseeable 
future, cash will thus remain a pillar of the nation’s economy. Even so, 
its importance will almost certainly continue to diminish. Further, those 
who use cash, especially large denomination notes, will likely be flagged 
as potential tax evaders.
53
 Finally, in a world dominated by non-cash 
users, cash users cannot insulate themselves completely even by their 
use of cash because there will likely be some electronic traces of their 
transactions with non-cash users, traces that will help identify at least 
some of their transactions and possible transgressions. 
Overall, though there are some differences between the underground 
economy and the tax gap, there are also clear overlaps. Thus, as the 
importance of cash diminishes, the tax gap should correspondingly 
narrow in size. 
B. Information Availability via Computerization 
Computers have opened the doors to information storage and 
utilization, the likes of which are historically unparalleled; they can 
readily save large stocks of information, and they can comb through 
such information at lightning speed.
54
 This has resulted in a second 
                                                     
Bloodless Victory, WASH. POST (May 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/killing-
this-bin-laden-is-a-no-brainer/2016/05/08/38843682-1515-11e6-aa55-670cabef46e0_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/X6JS-MLQG]; Peter Sands, Making It Harder for the Bad Guys: The Case for 
Eliminating High Denomination Notes, (Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, 
Harvard University, Working Paper No. 52, 2016), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/ 
publications/awp/awp52 [https://perma.cc/E5EL-EGUD]. 
53. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH (2016) (calling attention to the fact that 
aside from buoying corruption, terrorism, the drug trade, and human trafficking, the use of cash 
helps feed tax evasion). In an attempt to curtail tax evasion, India instituted a policy ridding the 
country of certain cash denominations (i.e., 500 and 1,000 rupee notes) and replacing these notes 
with new tender. Rishi Iyengar, 50 Days of Pain: What Happened When India Trashed Its Cash, 
CNN: MONEY (Jan. 4, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/04/news/india/india-cash-crisis-rupee/ 
[https://perma.cc/4YKH-QVSF]. See also India’s Cash Crisis Explained, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37983834 [https://perma.cc/YU7J-LLJN] (“The 
decision was taken to crack down on corruption and illegal cash holdings known as ‘black money.’ 
In an attempt to curb tax evasion, the government expects to bring billions of dollars of unaccounted 
cash into the economy because the banned bills make up more than 80% of the currency in 
circulation.”). 
54. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL 
EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES 3 (2004), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-548 
[https://perma.cc/D5D8-5BH3] (“The use of [data mining] has been driven by the exponential 
growth in the volumes and availability of information collected by the public and private sectors, as 
well as by advances in computing and data storage capabilities.”); Paul Schwartz, Data Processing 
and Government Administration: The Failure of the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 
HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1335 (1992) (“The computer’s remarkable ability to process and store vast 
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trend, namely, an unparalleled access to information. In particular, 
information storage, information retrieval, and information transmission 
have proven pivotal in ensuring compliance in vast swaths of the 
nation’s economy. 
Over the last several decades, Congress has put technology to use, 
requiring third-party tax information reporting throughout the 
economy.
55
 Employers must issue Form W-2, in which wage income is 
reported to the IRS and all employees.
56
 Banks and brokerage firms must 
issue Forms 1099-DIV and 1099-INT to investors, reporting interest and 
dividend income.
57
 Businesses must issue Form 1099-MISC to 
independent contractors, reporting payments for services rendered.
58
 The 
failure to prepare and timely submit these tax information returns is 
subject to penalties that have become increasingly onerous.
59
 
Consider a recent example of how Congress has capitalized upon 
technological advancements. For decades, upon the sale or disposition of 
taxpayers’ investment assets, taxpayers often failed to accurately report 
their assets’ tax bases in computing their gains and losses.60 Sometimes 
this was due to a lack of good record keeping, other times this was due 
to ignorance of how the law applied (e.g., the effect of a stock split on 
the tax basis of a capital stock investment), and yet other times it was 
                                                     
quantities of information results from combining binary math with extraordinary advances in the 
design of circuits, software, and magnetic storage devices.”). 
55. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Releases New Tax Gap Estimates; 
Compliance Rates Remain Statistically Unchanged From Previous Study (Jan. 6, 2012), 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/irs-releases-new-tax-gap-estimates-compliance-rates-remain-statistically-
unchanged-from-previous-study [https://perma.cc/B9RA-YS4A] (“Overall, compliance is highest 
where there is third-party information reporting and/or withholding. For example, most wages and 
salaries are reported by employers to the IRS on Forms W-2 and are subject to withholding. As a 
result, a net of only 1 percent of wage and salary income was misreported. But amounts subject to 
little or no information reporting had a 56 percent net misreporting rate in 2006.”); Karen Setze, 
Taxpayers Honest When Someone’s Checking, Say IRS Officials, 111 TAX NOTES 1216, 1216 
(2006) (“[R]esults from the recently completed individual reporting compliance study for 
2001 . . . showed that only 1.2 percent of wage income was underreported, 57 percent of nonfarm 
proprietor income was misreported . . . and 72 percent of farm income was misreported.”). 
56. I.R.C. § 6051(a) (2012). 
57. Id. §§ 6042(a), 6049(a). 
58. Id. § 6041(a). 
59. See id. §§ 6721, 6722 (in the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 
§ 8(b), 129 Stat. 362 (2015), Congress recently increased the penalties for inaccurate information 
returns from $100 to $250). 
60. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-603, CAPITAL GAINS TAX GAP: 
REQUIRING BROKERS TO REPORT SECURITIES COST BASIS WOULD IMPROVE COMPLIANCE IF 
RELATED CHALLENGES ARE ADDRESSED (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06603.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NR9F-ZLVD]. 
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done intentionally to minimize a tax burden.
61
 In 2008, Congress 
decided that taxpayers’ tax basis misreporting was contributing too 
greatly to the tax gap.
62
 Because the vast majority of taxpayers held their 
marketable security investments with sophisticated third-party brokers 
who had the resources to track the tax basis that their clients had in their 
investment assets and who also understood how to apply intricate tax 
basis adjustments, Congress took action.
63
 Notwithstanding cries from 
the financial and banking industries that they faced a mountain of 
technical issues that could not be overcome, Congress passed legislation 
mandating that third-party brokers track the tax bases that their clients 
had in their investments and report these dollar figures on tax 
information returns.
64
 This law has been in effect for several years, 
earning accolades from both the press and general public regarding its 
administrative efficiencies.
65
 It is also likely that there have been 
significant revenue gains from the law as basis misreporting has 
undoubtedly declined.
66
 
In light of technological advancements, the expansion of third-party 
tax information reporting shows no signs of abating. Congress has a 
powerful device at hand to monitor taxpayers’ income far more 
accurately than when, for example, the ancient Egyptians had to use the 
Nile’s height to gauge the amount of taxes that farmers were responsible 
for paying.
67
 Due to its benefits, Congress has expanded
68
 and will no 
doubt continue to expand third-party tax information reporting.
69
 
                                                     
61. Id. 
62. See The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 403, 122 
Stat. 3765, 3854–55 (requiring tax basis reporting beginning in the 2011 tax year). 
63. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 60. 
64. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 403, 122 Stat. 
3765, 3854–55 (requiring tax basis reporting beginning in the 2011 tax year). 
65. See Tara Siegel Bernard, New Laws Take Guesswork out of Investment Tax Liability, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/your-money/new-tax-laws-cover-cost-
basis-of-investments.html [https://perma.cc/AJA9-U32Z]. 
66. See Jonathan Horn, The Brave New World of Cost Basis Reporting, J. ACCOUNTANCY (Aug. 
31, 2013), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2013/sep/20137345.html [https://perma.cc 
/42FB-ZNFC] (explaining taxpayers’ tax basis reporting obligations under the then new law and, as 
a result, how greater tax compliance was a likely upshot). 
67. Aristide Theodorides, The Concept of Law in Ancient Egypt, in THE LEGACY OF EGYPT 291, 
292 (J. R. Harris ed., 2d ed. 1971). 
68. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6050W (requiring information reporting for certain credit and debit card 
transactions). See generally Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax 
Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733 (2010). 
69. See, e.g., James Alm & Jay A. Soled, Tax Basis Determinations, Pass-Through Entities, and 
Taxpayer Noncompliance, 40 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 693 (2014) (beyond marketable securities, Congress 
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As discussed in more detail below, the IRS has gained from these 
technological advancements and innovations in terms of (1) efficiency 
improvements and (2) overseas account reporting. 
1. Efficiency Improvements 
By capitalizing upon technological advancements, the tax 
administration process has made remarkable strides in efficiency. These 
improvements are essentially twofold in nature: ease of processing and 
increase in accuracy. 
Consider first the ease of processing. In earlier, pre-computer times, 
the IRS would receive handwritten and typed tax returns; once received, 
the information populating these tax returns would be manually 
keypunched into computers, a truly labor-intensive task that was prone 
to transcription errors.
70
 In the technological era, this antiquated system 
of processing has been virtually eliminated.
71
 Now it only takes 
milliseconds for IRS computers to match third-party information returns 
with self-reported taxpayer declarations. Electronic filing enables 
millions of tax information returns prepared by third parties, with 
billions of individual entries, to be received, processed, and matched 
with the electronically received tax return counterparts submitted by 
taxpayers. In 2015 (for the 2014 filing season), close to ninety percent of 
individual income tax returns were filed electronically.
72
 This percentage 
is anticipated to grow
73
 and will further improve the ability of the IRS to 
more quickly gather information, more rapidly process this information, 
and more efficiently target its enforcement efforts. 
Third-party tax information reporting expansion has had a remarkable 
impact on tax compliance. Empirical evidence strongly supports the 
virtues of third-party tax information reporting: when third-party tax 
information return reporting is present (particularly when coupled with 
withholding), tax compliance is high.
74
 The converse is also true: in the 
                                                     
might consider extending third-party tax basis reporting to pass-through entity investments such as 
partnerships and S corporations). 
70. PAUL E. CERUZZI, A HISTORY OF MODERN COMPUTING 120 (2d ed. 2003). 
71. Id. at 122. 
72. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 3415, ELECTRONIC TAX DOCUMENT ADMINISTRATION 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT TO CONGRESS (2016), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3415.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RTU8-QJJB]. 
73. Id. 
74. Through its audits, the IRS has established the Net Misreporting Percentage (NMP) for 
different sources of income, which measure the unreported (or “misreported”) income as a fraction 
of the estimated “true” income. (To illustrate, suppose that unreported income equals $20 and 
reported income equals $80. Then the NMP equals ($20/[$20+$80]), or twenty percent.) As 
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absence of third-party tax information return reporting, tax compliance 
plummets.
75
 
                                                     
indicated in the table below (for 2001), the IRS estimated that the NMPs are lowest for income 
types that are matched with third-party information sources and highest for nonmatched income 
types. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX YEAR 2001 FEDERAL TAX GAP (2007), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/01rastg07map.pdf [https://perma.cc/53XH-VSAB]. For example, the 
NMP for wages and salaries (which, aside from information return matching, e.g., Form W-2, is 
also subject to employer withholding) is virtually zero, at 1.2%.  
 
Table 1: 
IRS Estimates of Net Misreporting Percentages, 2001 Tax Gap Estimates 
 
Source of Income Net Misreporting Percentage (%) 
Wages and Salaries 1.2 
Interest and Dividends 3.7 
Pensions and IRA Income 4.1 
Unemployment Income 11.1 
S Corps, Partnerships, and Trusts 17.8 
Capital Gains 11.8 
Alimony Income 7.2 
Nonfarm Business Income 57.1 
Farm Income 72.0 
Other Gains 64.4 
Rent and Royalties 51.3 
Other Income 63.5 
 
Updated IRS estimates for the 2006 and the 2008–2010 tax gaps depict a largely similar pattern, 
although the updated estimates report the NMP only for broader income categories. See Press 
Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Releases New Tax Gap Estimates; Compliance Rates Remain 
Statistically Unchanged from Previous Study (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-12-
004.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UAN-HELQ]; Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 3. Similar results apply for 
other years as well. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 6. 
75. As indicated in the table below, the NMPs for income that is not subject to third-party 
matching (e.g., nonfarm business income, farm income, other gains, and rent and royalties) exceed 
fifty percent. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006 (Jan. 6, 2012), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDZ2-9M3Y]. 
Similar results apply to the more recent tax gap estimates, although the NMPs in the 2008–2010 
estimates are only for the individual income tax. 
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Consider next the heightened level of accuracy that is part and parcel 
of the electronic filing process. In the past, taxpayers had to rely on 
pencil and paper, abacuses, and calculators to compute their income, 
deductions, and credits—and ultimately their tax due. These modes of 
making numeric calculations had varying degrees of accuracy. In 
contrast, numeric calculations made by tax return preparation software 
are apt to be pluperfect.
76
 This perfection largely eliminates the portion 
of the tax gap that was previously attributable to taxpayers’ 
mathematical mistakes. 
In the twenty-first century, the transformative nature of electronic 
filing is often taken for granted. However, one should not be blasé about 
it. Electronic filing enables millions of tax information returns prepared 
by third parties, with billions of individual entries, to be received, 
processed, and matched with their electronically received counterparts of 
the tax returns submitted by taxpayers. The manner and speed in which 
this matching is handled is unprecedented in the history of tax collection. 
Indeed, this constitutes one of the pivotal reasons why the tax gap is 
likely to be narrowed in future years. 
                                                     
Table 2: 
IRS Estimates of Net Misreporting Percentages, 2006 Tax Gap Estimates 
 
Type of Income Net Misreporting 
Percentage (%) 
Percentage of 
Tax Gap (%) 
Subject to substantial information reporting and 
withholding (wages and salaries) 
1 5.3 
Subject to substantial information reporting (pensions and 
annuities, unemployment compensation, dividends, interest, 
Social Security benefits) 
8 5.8 
Subject to some information reporting (deductions, 
exemptions, partnerships and S corporation income, capital 
gains, alimony income) 
11 30.9 
Subject to little or no information reporting (nonfarm 
proprietor income, other income, rents and royalties, farm 
income, Form 4797 income, adjustments) 
56 58.0 
 
76. E.g., compare INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2014, 
at 39 tbl.15 (2015), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14databk.pdf [https://perma.cc/29QW-FRGE] 
(reporting that the number of mathematical errors found on individual income tax returns for the 
2013 filing season was 2,266,024), with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
DATA BOOK 2008, at 38 tbl.15 (2009), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08databkrevised.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/998F-VX5S] (reporting that the number of mathematical errors found on 
individual income tax returns for the 2007 filing season was 3,670,071). 
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2. Overseas Account Reporting 
It was not long ago that many taxpayers would park their investments 
overseas and then “forget” to report the income earned on these 
investments on their U.S. income tax returns.
77
 Overseas investment 
venues that were especially popular included Switzerland and various 
Caribbean islands.
78
 For decades, this practice generated massive tax 
revenue losses, augmenting the tax gap’s size.79 In theory, taxpayers who 
engaged in such subterfuge risked detection and punishment, including 
criminal prosecution.
80
 However, the chances of detection were 
infinitesimally small, particularly in light of Swiss bank secrecy laws 
that made taxpayers’ bank accounts seemingly inaccessible to the 
outside world.
81
 Several developments, though, have largely removed 
the advantage that taxpayers once had in being able to hide their 
overseas income, developments related to information storage, retrieval, 
and transmission. 
Information Storage. By way of background, vast volumes of 
information can now be stored on hard drives, disks, thumb drives, and 
in the cloud. Computer users can prevent access to this sensitive 
information through the use of appropriate passwords, so-called 
firewalls, and other prophylactic measures. These efforts to safeguard 
information are sometimes successful; other times, they are not. 
When it comes to income, overseas banks have historically retained 
this information electronically. The IRS has recently been able to gain 
                                                     
77. For a comprehensive overview of the problem, see JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION (2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WPG-MP59]. 
78. See STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & 
GOV’T AFFAIRS, TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY, 109th Cong., at 
9, 15–16 (2006), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-tax-haven-abuses-the-enablers-the-
tools-and-secrecy [https://perma.cc/J3MZ-SLB6] (“This Report presents several case histories of 
persons who hid assets or shifted income to offshore jurisdictions, including Belize, the British 
Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Isle of Man, Nevis, and Panama.”). 
79. See Joseph Guttentag & Reuven Avi-Yonah, Closing the International Tax Gap, in BRIDGING 
THE TAX GAP: ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION (Max B. Sawicky ed., 
2005); Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN. 
L. REV. 675 (2012); Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Citizens Hide Hundreds of Billions in Cayman 
Accounts, 103 TAX NOTES 956 (2004); David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheats Called Out of Control, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at B2. 
80. I.R.C. § 7201 (2012). 
81. See Jared Seff, Cracking Down on Tax Evaders—Swiss Banking: Secrets, Lies, and 
Deceptions, 38 S.U. L. REV. 159, 173–75 (presenting an overview of the history of Swiss bank 
secrecy laws); Carolyn B. Lovejoy, UBS Strikes a Deal: The Recent Impact of Weakened Bank 
Secrecy on Swiss Banking, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 435, 442–46 (2010) (same). 
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access to this electronic information through two channels: from “rogue 
insiders,” who are motivated by whistle-blower reward money or 
revenge
82
 and from “rogue outsiders” (aka “hackers”), whose 
motivations are often elusive but who are determined to get this sensitive 
information into the public domain.
83
 Whatever the case, the IRS is the 
benefactor of these rogue insiders and outsiders, obtaining 
unprecedented access to what was once veiled and secretive information. 
Information Retrieval. In the aftermath of security information 
breaches at several financial institutions,
84
 retail stores,
85
 and even the 
IRS,
86
 the general public has quickly learned that electronic information 
is not impermeable to leaks and can be retrieved by official (and 
unofficial) agents, wherever and however it is stored and safeguarded. 
Due to the vulnerabilities of detection, the risk of potential blackmail, 
and the threat of possible criminal prosecution, the allure of parking 
assets overseas has been greatly diminished. The massive number of 
taxpayers participating in the IRS’s Voluntary Disclosure Program 
attests to the fact that this mode of hiding income has come to a virtual 
halt.
87
 
                                                     
82. See David Kocieniewski, Get Out of Jail Free? No, It’s Better, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at 
A1 (describing how Bradley Birkenfeld disclosed the identity of many U.S. taxpayers who had hid 
assets in Swiss bank accounts and, as a result, was subsequently awarded a whistle-blower amount 
of $104 million); Laura Saunders & Robin Sidel, Whistleblower Gets $104 Million, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 12, 2012, at C1 (same). As a direct result of the information Birkenfeld provided, UBS paid 
the U.S. government $780 million to avoid criminal prosecution, and the bank agreed to turn over 
account information for over 4,500 U.S. taxpayers. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States 
v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/tax/legacy/2009/02/19/UBS_Signed_Deferred_Prosecution_Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3QFJ-SRST]. 
83. See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt & Steven Lee Myers, Panama Law Firm’s Leaked Files Detail 
Offshore Accounts Tied to World Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, at D2 (Apr. 3, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/04/us/politics/leaked-documents-offshore-accounts-putin.html 
[https://perma.cc/B8NR-VUF2]. 
84. See Danny Yadron, Emily Glazer & Devlin Barrett, J.P. Morgan Hackers Attempted to 
Infiltrate Other Financial Institutions, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-
morgan-hackers-attempted-to-infiltrate-other-financial-institutions-1412637570 
[https://perma.cc/Q4BX-ULWM]. 
85. See Bill Hardekopf, The Big Data Breaches of 2014, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2015), http:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2015/01/13/the-big-data-breaches-of-2014/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2C4A-Q8HZ]. 
86. See Elizabeth Weise, IRS Hacked, 100,000 Tax Accounts Breached, U.S.A. TODAY (May 26, 
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/05/26/irs-breach-100000-accounts-get-transcript/ 
27980049/ [https://perma.cc/W73G-LA7S]. 
87. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Says Offshore Effort Tops $5 Billion, 
Announces New Details on the Voluntary Disclosure Program and Closing of Offshore Loophole 
(June 26, 2012), https://www.irs.gov/uac/irs-says-offshore-effort-tops-5-billion-announces-new-
details-on-the-voluntary-disclosure-program-and-closing-of-offshore-loophole [https://perma.cc/2Q 
 
04 - Alm & Soled.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/2017  1:30 PM 
2017] W(H)ITHER THE TAX GAP? 541 
 
Information Transmission. Congress did not want to leave to chance 
whether the IRS could detect evasion or whether rogue insiders or 
outsiders were sufficiently motivated to take disclosure action.
88
 The 
legislative branch therefore recently took steps to help ensure 
compliance, steps that, even a decade earlier, were probably not 
technologically feasible. 
The problem Congress sought to address was fairly simple. 
Unscrupulous taxpayers would park funds overseas and then, as 
disguised foreign investors, reinvest these funds in the United States.
89
 
By engaging in this transformation process, almost akin to money 
laundering, U.S. taxpayers could skirt their tax obligations with virtual 
impunity.
90
 In addressing these tax concerns, bilateral tax treaties, tax 
information exchange agreements, and the Conventions in Mutual 
Administrative Assistance on Tax Matters with other countries had 
proven wholly inadequate.
91
 
The congressional solution is embodied in the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA).
92
 The salient features of FATCA are 
twofold. The first feature is a requirement that foreign financial 
                                                     
G7-23WV]; Lovejoy, supra note 81, at 436 (“The recent changes in the interpretation of Swiss bank 
secrecy laws, as evidenced by the Deferred Prosecution Agreement with UBS, will likely cause: (1) 
irreparable harm to Swiss banking industry; (2) virtual elimination of tax avoidance techniques 
previously available to American depositors in Swiss banks; and (3) greater tax revenues for the 
U.S. government.”). See generally Edward A. Morse, Whistleblowers and Tax Enforcement: Using 
Inside Information to Close the “Tax Gap”, 24 AKRON TAX J. 1 (2009).  
88. Aside from congressional legislative actions, the IRS has taken its own measures to use 
technology to detect noncompliance. See Richard Satran, IRS High-Tech Tools Track Your Digital 
Footprints, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 4, 2013), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-
finance/mutual-funds/articles/2013/04/04/irs-high-tech-tools-track-your-digital-footprints [https:// 
perma.cc/D7WL-4XWR] (“The Internal Revenue Service is collecting a lot more than taxes this 
year—it’s also acquiring a huge volume of personal information on taxpayers’ digital activities, 
from eBay auctions to Facebook posts and, for the first time ever, credit card and e-payment 
transaction records, as it expands its search for tax cheats to places it’s never gone before.”); ERIC 
TODER, URBAN INST. & URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR., REDUCING THE TAX GAP: THE 
ILLUSION OF PAIN-FREE DEFICIT REDUCTION 9 (July 3, 2007), http://www.urban.org/sites/ 
default/files/publication/46536/411496-Reducing-the-Tax-Gap-The-Illusion-of-Pain-Free-Deficit-
Reduction.PDF [https://perma.cc/C5X6-JYEJ] (“IRS has recently funded development of advanced 
computational and data mining techniques to detect patterns of flows between entities that suggest 
the possibility of abuse.”). 
89. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A Retrospective 
After a Decade, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 783, 793 (2009). 
90. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 
WITH RESPECT TO OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS AND ENTITIES, 111th Cong., at 18 (2009), https://www.jct. 
gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3520 [https://perma.cc/RS8B-LLRS]. 
91. Id. at 50–58. 
92. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501–62, 124 Stat. 71, 
97–118 (2010). 
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institutions
93
 provide detailed information to the IRS regarding their 
account holders. This information includes: (i) whether the investor is a 
U.S. person (based upon due diligence procedures detailed in Treasury 
regulations);
94
 and (ii) reporting annually (a) the name, address, and 
Taxpayer Identification Number of each U.S. account holder; (b) the 
account number; (c) the amount balance or value held in such account; 
and (d) the gross receipts and gross withdrawals or payments from the 
account during the year.
95
 The second feature of FATCA is its extensive 
penalty withholding system. In broad terms, the Code now imposes a 
thirty percent withholding tax regime upon payments made to 
nonparticipating foreign financial institutions
96
 and so-called recalcitrant 
account holders (i.e., those investors who choose not to disclose their 
national identity).
97
 The scope of payments upon which withholding 
extends is extraordinarily broad and includes any U.S.-based payment of 
interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, 
compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or 
determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income.
98
 
Furthermore, the scope extends to “any gross proceeds from the sale or 
disposition of any property . . . which can produce interest or dividends 
from sources within the United States.”99 
The effects of FATCA are just beginning to emerge. While many 
foreign financial institutions and others have bemoaned FATCA’s 
administrative burdens and the concomitant expenses,
100
 FATCA brings 
                                                     
93. I.R.C. § 1471(d)(4)–(5) (2012) defines “foreign financial institution” as any foreign entity that  
(A) accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a banking or similar business  
(B) as a substantial portion of its business, holds financial assets for the account  
of others, or  
(C) is engaged (or holding itself out as being engaged) primarily in the business of investing, 
reinvesting, or trading in securities (as defined in section 475(c)(2) without regard to the last 
sentence thereof), partnership interests, commodities (as defined in section 475(e)(2)), or any 
interest (including a futures or forward contract or option) in such securities, partnership 
interests, or commodities. 
94. Id. § 1471(b)(1)(A). 
95. Id. § 1471(c)(1)(A)–(D). 
96. Id. § 1471(a). 
97. Id. § 1471(d)(6). 
98. Id. § 1473(1)(A)(i). 
99. Id. § 1473(1)(A)(ii). 
100. See, e.g., Tracy A. Kaye, Innovations in the War Against Tax Evasion, 2014 BYU L. REV. 
363, 363 (2014) (“FATCA garnered worldwide attention. The European Union expressed its 
concerns to the U.S. Treasury about the compliance burden on the financial industry and the conflict 
with EU Member States’ laws on privacy and data protection.”); see also Alison Bennett, Tax 
Legislation: Dozens of Stakeholders from Around Globe Raise Concerns on FATCA Regime, 29 
TAX MGM’T WKLY. REP. (BNA) 1535 (2010); Dean Marsan, FATCA: The Global Financial System 
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incredibly important tax compliance information to light. No longer can 
foreign financial institutions blind themselves to the nationality of their 
investors; if they do, they risk having all of their investors subject to an 
onerous withholding tax regime related to their U.S. investments. 
Overseas tax reform measures did not stop there. In the face of the 
financial crises and urged on by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), G20 countries convened a summit 
in early 2009. During the course of this summit, participating nations, 
under the threat of economic sanctions, urged many tax havens to sign 
bilateral tax treaties that required the exchange of bank information.
101
 
By the end of 2009, erstwhile tax havens had signed more than 300 
treaties, widely seen as one of the most significant actions against tax 
evasion via tax havens that had ever been undertaken.
102
 
As a practical matter, then, taxpayers are finding it increasingly 
difficult to hide their income from tax authorities around the world.
103
 In 
a nutshell, technological advancements have enabled Congress to pass 
laws that usher in a new era of tax transparency, eschewing past 
opaqueness. 
C. A Shifting Labor Force 
A third trend is that national economies are experiencing seismic 
labor force shifts. Individuals are increasingly gravitating toward work 
in ever-larger business enterprises. Compelling evidence for this 
                                                     
Must Now Implement a New U.S. Reporting and Withholding System for Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance, Which Will Create Significant New Exposures—Managing This Risk (Part III), 88 
TAXES 21 (2010). 
 101. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE ERA OF BANK SECRECY IS OVER: THE 
G20/OECD PROCESS IS DELIVERING RESULTS (2011), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/60/ 
48996146.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KQW-9ZFN]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-
730, IRS’S INFORMATION EXCHANGES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES COULD BE IMPROVED THROUGH 
BETTER PERFORMANCE INFORMATION (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585299.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5854-GJTH]. 
102. See Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the 
G20 Tax Haven Crackdown, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 65 (2014). These enforcement efforts 
have continued since then, albeit the exact effects of these treaties remain uncertain. Id. 
103. See Peter Eavis, In Panama Papers, Finding the Good News in Widespread Tax Cheating, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/upshot/finding-the-good-news-in-
widespread-tax-cheating.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5737-Q7UZ] (“[S]ince 2011, around 20 
governments have collected some $50 billion in additional taxes as a result of the anti-evasion 
efforts. Even the documents reported to be from [the Panama law firm charged with abetting tax 
fraud] showed a decline in the number of offshore companies set up by the firm. Ten years ago, the 
number was around 13,200; in 2015 it was just over 4,300.”). See generally Susan C. Morse, Ask for 
Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax Reporting, 57 VILL. L. REV. 529 (2012). 
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proposition is found in reports from the U.S. Census Bureau.
104
 The 
most recent report indicates that only 17.6% of the labor force now 
works for “very small enterprises” (defined as having fewer than twenty 
employees);
105
 the rest of the labor force works for small, medium, and 
large enterprises.
106
 Indeed, over half of the nation’s labor force now 
works for “large enterprises” (defined as having 500 or more 
employees).
107
 This trend began decades ago, and it has continued in 
recent years. 
A simple illustration shows the economic effects of this shifting labor 
force. Many supermarket chains now offer one-stop shopping, including 
a recently opened ShopRite Supermarket in one of the author’s 
neighborhoods. Aside from a cornucopia of food offerings commonplace 
in most national supermarket chains, this ShopRite Supermarket has 
several “sub-stores” under its roof: a fresh vegetable stand (including a 
farmers’ market on Sundays); an enormous bakery; a deli that makes 
every variety of sandwich, wrap, and panini; a complete oyster bar; a 
health food juicing stand; a salad bar that stretches several aisles; a 
gourmet coffee department staffed with knowledgeable baristas; a 
pizzeria that makes every variety of pizza, stromboli, and calzone; a 
florist that has a broad array of floral offerings; and a sushi stand. This 
Shoprite Supermarket is open seven days a week from 7 a.m. until 11 
p.m. and is open every day of the year, including Thanksgiving, 
Christmas, and New Year’s Day. 
The opening of this ShopRite Supermarket has had significant 
consequences for many surrounding small businesses. For every dollar 
spent at this ShopRite Supermarket, there is correspondingly one less 
dollar spent at the local township’s farmers’ market, bakery, kosher deli, 
fish market, health food market, florist, and restaurants. Anecdotal 
evidence from these surrounding small business enterprises indicates 
that the economic stresses arising from the Shoprite Supermarket 
opening have put many of them at risk of closing.
108
 
                                                     
104. See ANTHONY CARUSO, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, G12-SUSB, STATISTICS OF U.S. BUSINESSES 
EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL SUMMARY: 2012 (2015), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/ 
library/publications/2015/econ/g12-susb.pdf [https://perma.cc/HVC4-ASSC]. 
105. Id. at 1. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See About Us, SHOPRITE, http://www.shoprite.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/3F8U-
DTDU] (identifying ShopRite as the largest retailer-owned cooperative and largest employer in the 
state of New Jersey). 
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This scenario is emblematic of a widespread global phenomenon in 
which mammoth-sized business enterprises, such as Wal-Mart, Costco, 
Home Depot, and Lowe’s, have become commonplace fixtures dotting 
the urban, suburban, and rural landscapes throughout the country. These 
enterprises often have a crushing effect on the surrounding small 
businesses.
109
 Study after study affirms this proposition, referred to, at 
least in the context of Wal-Mart, as the “Wal-Mart Effect.”110 
It is not our intention to evaluate the broader positive and negative 
economic effects of the rise of mammoth-sized business enterprises 
(e.g., consumers may pay less for their purchases,
111
 jobs are created in 
the larger business enterprises but lost in the smaller ones, and/or 
employees’ benefits may be meager112). However, from a tax 
perspective, this labor market trend is clearly one that will lead to 
enhanced tax compliance. The reasons are threefold. 
First, large businesses offer considerably fewer tax-evasion 
opportunities than small businesses. Because of the ease with which 
small business owners may collude to evade taxes,
113
 they are 
notoriously tax noncompliant.
114
 Indeed, the classic case of collusion is 
                                                     
109. See David Neumark, Junfu Zhang & Stephen Ciccarella, The Effects of Wal-Mart on Local 
Labor Markets, 63 J. URBAN ECON. 405, 428 (2008) (“On average, Wal-Mart store openings reduce 
retail employment by about 2.7 percent, implying that each Wal-Mart employee replaces about 1.4 
employees in the rest of the retail sector.”); Tatiana Schlossberg, Manhattan’s Corner Stores, a 
Neighborhood Staple, Struggling to Survive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2015, at A18 (“Bodegas look for 
ways to stay open as rents rise and chain stores grow.”). 
110. See Emek Basker, The Causes and Consequences of Wal-Mart’s Growth, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 
177, 178 (2007) (“Between 1963—one year after the first Wal-Mart store opened in Rogers, 
Arkansas—and 2002, the number of single-store retailers in the United States declined by 55 
percent while the number of chain stores nearly doubled. The number of stores belonging to chains 
with 100 or more stores more than tripled over this period (U.S. Census Bureau, 1963, 2002).”). 
111. See Emek Basker, Selling a Cheaper Mousetrap: Wal-Mart’s Effects on Retail Prices, 58 J. 
URBAN ECON. 203 (2005). 
112. See Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Memo Suggests Ways to Cut 
Employee Benefit Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/business 
/walmart-memo-suggests-ways-to-cut-employee-benefit-costs.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/W3EF-
P56N] (“A draft memo to Wal-Mart’s board was obtained from Wal-Mart Watch, a nonprofit group, 
allied with labor unions, that asserts that Wal-Mart’s pay and benefits are too low.”). 
113. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1014, TAX GAP: A STRATEGY FOR 
REDUCING THE GAP SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIETOR 
NONCOMPLIANCE 10 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/265399.pdf [https://perma.cc/854P-
Z6RR] (“[A]n estimated 70 percent of Schedule C filers in 2001 (about 12.9 million) made an error 
when reporting net business income (that is, net profit or loss on line 31 of Schedule C). Most of the 
misreporting was underreporting. . . . [A]n estimated 61 percent of Schedule C filers underreported 
their net income and 9 percent overreported.”). 
114. See, e.g., Kathleen Delaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect Theory Approach 
to Increasing Small Business Compliance, 67 TAX L. REV. 111, 113 (2013) (“When combined with 
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the sole proprietor who needs only to look in the mirror to decide (with 
his reflection) whether, for tax purposes, he should report, say, the $800 
he received in cash proceeds from his business that day. With two 
owners, the need for collusion obviously makes evasion more 
challenging, but not insurmountable, particularly in those cases when the 
co-owners are married or siblings, with common economic interests. In 
contrast, because evasion opportunities are virtually nonexistent for 
employees of large-scale business enterprises, they are generally tax 
compliant.
115
 Consider that large business enterprises often are 
structured in a pyramid fashion, with each layer of the pyramid 
overseeing the one immediately below. This oversight greatly reduces 
the risk of collusion because, at every pyramid level, all employees 
know that employees at the oversight layer immediately above (i.e., their 
superiors) will require a full accounting for every dollar coming in and 
leaving the layer below. 
Second, large business enterprises are predominantly publicly 
owned.
116
 In such cases, the elected board of directors is held 
accountable to the shareholders.
117
 Because bonuses and pay raises are 
often tied to earnings, management generally will do everything within 
its power to show robust profits.
118
 Hiding income may contribute to 
profits, but evasion exposes management to condemnation (or worse) if 
discovered.
119
 
Third, and most importantly, large business enterprises have special 
reporting obligations that dissuade tax noncompliance. These reporting 
obligations are reflected by two schedules that corporate taxpayers must 
complete as part of Form 1120 (U.S. Corporate Tax Return): Schedule 
M-1 (Reconciliation of Income (Loss) per Books with Income per 
                                                     
under-reported self-employment tax ($57 billion), individual small business noncompliance 
accounts for approximately $179 billion, or 40% of the total tax gap.”).  
115. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006, at 3 chart 1 (2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9GC-X45Z] 
(wages and salaries have a “net misreporting percentage” (defined as the ratio of net misreported 
income to true income) of one percent). 
116. See America’s 500 Biggest Companies, TIME (Oct. 30, 2014), http://time.com/3550055/ 
fortune-500-2014/ [https://perma.cc/BEN3-4E8T] (listing the nation’s five hundred largest 
companies, the vast majority of which are publicly traded). 
117. See Walter A. Effross, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 1–26 (2d ed. 
2013). 
118. See id. at 421–500. 
119. Id. at 43–136; see, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 
(Del. Ch. 1996) (suggesting that a board of directors’ failure to establish or adequately oversee a 
system designed to prevent violations of applicable legal standards may expose directors to personal 
liability). 
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Return)
120
 and Schedule UTP (Uncertain Tax Position Statement). 
Schedule M-1 reflects differences between income reporting under 
generally accepted accounting principles and income reporting under the 
Internal Revenue Code; the larger the difference between these two 
dollar amounts, the more likely that the IRS will conduct an audit.
121
 The 
heightened chance for an IRS audit presumably dissuades many 
taxpayers from taking aggressive tax positions. Schedule UTP functions 
in a similar manner. If, for federal income tax purposes, a “large” 
corporate taxpayer (defined as having $10 million of assets on its 
audited financial statements)
122
 has audited financial statements in which 
it or a related party has recorded a reserve for an “uncertain” tax position 
(i.e., a position that it anticipates the IRS may challenge), the taxpayer 
must submit a Schedule UTP.
123
 This reporting mandate assists the IRS 
in the detection process of aggressive tax return positions; and, like the 
Schedule M-1, it creates incentives for large-business-enterprise 
taxpayers to exercise caution.
124
 
*   *   * 
To date, there is little empirical information that directly supports the 
proposition that these three trends—the rise of electronic transactions, 
information availability via computerization, and a shifting labor force—
are closing the tax gap. Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons to 
strongly suggest that this should soon be the case. On the whole, then, 
the tax gap may be finally meeting its match, not so much from IRS 
enforcement efforts per se but from these technological and economic 
trends. 
                                                     
120. Those corporations that report on Schedule L of Form 1120 total assets at the end of the 
corporation’s (or U.S. consolidated tax group’s) taxable year equaling or exceeding $10 million 
must file an even more detailed schedule, known as Schedule M-3 (Net Income (Loss) 
Reconciliations for Corporations with Total Assets of $10 Million or More). 
121. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, 
ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (1999), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/Report-Corporate-Tax-Shelters-1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9U3-4ZAU]; Gil B. 
Manzon, Jr. & George A. Plesko, The Relation Between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of 
Income, 55 TAX L. REV. 175, 176 (2002).  
122. Rev. Proc. 2010-63, I.R.B. 420. 
123. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE UTP (FORM 1120) 1 (2012). 
124. See generally Ilya A. Lipin, Uncertain Tax Positions and the New Tax Policy of Disclosure 
Through the Schedule UTP, 30 VA. TAX REV. 663 (2011). 
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III. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
If the aforementioned trends do in fact work over time to reduce the 
tax gap, the public policy implications would be vast, with significant 
and far-reaching economic, political, and administrative dimensions. 
Consider each in the following three sections. 
A. Economic Dimensions 
Recall the range of economic effects associated with the tax gap’s 
existence, starting with a loss in tax revenues and extending to 
inefficiencies in resource allocation and inequities in the tax burden.
125
 A 
declining tax gap would clearly tend to reverse these effects. Put 
differently, if the existence of the tax gap affects revenue adequacy, 
resource allocation efficiency, and distributional equity of taxation, then 
a declining tax gap would have similar—but opposite—effects on these 
economic aspects. 
Revenue Adequacy. The effects on tax collections are clear-cut. The 
existence of the tax gap generates substantial revenue losses;
126
 if there 
is a declining tax gap, then this will generate additional revenues, which 
will allow increases in spending, decreases in taxes, or both. 
Resource Allocation Efficiency. The effects on efficiency are more 
complicated. The existence of sectors to which resources may move to 
evade taxes means that taxes create incentives for such movement. This 
movement generates inefficiencies, commonly referred to as the “excess 
burden of taxation” and defined as welfare losses in excess of tax 
revenues actually collected. Put differently, the excess burden of a tax is 
a measure of the lost output due to the distorting effects of the tax.
127
 
                                                     
125. See supra Part II. 
126. See supra Part II. 
127. The nature of the inefficiency of taxation can be illustrated by way of a simple example. 
Suppose that the advertised price for a new watch is $40 and suppose further that one person is 
willing to pay $55 for the watch and that another person is willing to pay $45. By paying the 
advertised price of $40, both individuals benefit, the first by $15 and the second by $5, for a total 
benefit of $20, which is called the consumer surplus. Now, consider what happens if an excise tax 
of $10 per watch is imposed, raising the price to $50. The person who was willing to pay $55 will 
still purchase the watch and pay a tax of $10, enjoying only a $5 benefit. The person who was 
willing to pay $45 will no longer purchase the watch because its cost ($50) is now greater than the 
amount he was willing to pay ($45). The tax has generated revenues of $10, but the tax has also 
made both individuals worse off: the consumer surplus has fallen by $15, from $20 to only $5. 
Because the $15 decline in consumer surplus is greater than the tax revenues of $10, there is an 
excess burden that equals the difference, or $5. Almost all taxes generate excess burden because 
most taxes cause taxpayers (and employers) to change their behavior. The overall losses to everyone 
in society constitute an estimate of the total excess burden, or the total efficiency loss, of taxes. 
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In the presence of taxation, labor, capital, and other factors of 
production have often migrated into the untaxed, or underground, 
economy to evade taxation, a migration that affects the production (as 
well as prices) of goods and services in the untaxed and taxed sectors. 
This movement of resources generates economic inefficiencies as there 
is an increase in the production of goods and services that are untaxed 
and there is a decline in goods and services that are taxed appropriately. 
However, a decline in the tax gap means that the possibility of 
evading taxes via mobility into untaxed sectors is reduced. As a result, 
the resource misallocation described in the prior paragraph will be 
reversed, and there will be corresponding efficiency gains. While 
identifying these resource allocation efficiency effects requires a detailed 
computable general equilibrium model of the economy, existing studies 
suggest that the efficiency gains from a reduction in the tax gap would 
be quite significant, potentially as large as 10% to 30% of taxes and 
between 3% and 7% of output.
128
 
Closely related to these efficiency effects are their sectoral, 
occupational, and employment effects. As a general rule, resources 
migrate to those economic sectors that yield the highest returns; when 
those economic sectors are taxed, the migration process reverses as taxes 
diminish returns.
129
 In the presence of the tax gap, this means that 
workers have an incentive to choose employment in those sectors where 
cash use predominates and taxes go unpaid. Assuming labor is mobile, 
labor will respond to taxes in the taxed sector by moving between the 
taxed and untaxed sectors until the net-of-tax return across the various 
sectors is equalized.
130
 This movement affects the wages of labor in the 
different sectors, raising gross-of-tax wages in the taxed sector as labor 
flows away from this sector while simultaneously reducing wages in 
untaxed sectors as labor migrates into these sectors.
131
 However, if the 
possibility of evading taxes is reduced as the tax gap declines, then 
mobility effects will be reversed. 
Fully identifying these impacts once again requires a detailed general 
equilibrium model of the economy. A study conducted in another 
country, Colombia, demonstrates the mobility effects associated with tax 
                                                     
128. Alm, The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy, supra note 29, at 255–57; Alm, 
Analyzing and Reforming Tunisia’s Tax System, supra note 29, at 354–55. 
129. See supra note 29. 
130. See id. 
131. There will also be an impact on the returns to other factors of production, product prices, and 
the overall unemployment rate. See James Alm & Edward B. Sennoga, Mobility, Competition, and 
the Distributional Effects of Tax Evasion, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 1055 (2010). 
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evasion.
132
 Using a general equilibrium model that divided the 
Colombian economy into four sectors (farming, urban/informal, 
urban/unskilled, and urban/skilled), the study found that high rates of 
labor taxation led to an overall increase in the number of unemployed 
workers and also increased employment in the informal sector.
133
 A 
decline in the tax gap would reverse the incentives for labor to migrate 
to the untaxed sector via its effects on the relative returns in the untaxed 
and taxed sectors.
134
 
Distributional Equity. The existence of the tax gap also has major 
effects on the distribution of income, although these effects are generally 
misunderstood. The standard assumption underlying the incidence of tax 
evasion is that the successful evader retains the evaded income in its 
entirety so that the beneficiaries of evasion are its perpetrators.
135
 
However, this assumption is likely to be incorrect or at least incomplete. 
Those who benefit from tax evasion are not necessarily the individuals 
actually engaging in evasion. Indeed, these participants may not 
financially benefit at all. In many situations, tax evasion can be viewed 
as a “tax advantage” generated by the tax laws. However, if there is any 
advantage at all, then replication and competition will work toward the 
elimination of this advantage. A general equilibrium process of 
adjustment should then occur through changes in the relative prices of 
both commodities and factors of production as resources move into and 
out of the relevant activities, and these changes should tend to eliminate, 
or at least to reduce, the initial financial advantage associated with tax 
evasion.
136
 These types of general equilibrium effects are not typically 
considered in the standard approach to tax evasion. 
A simple case that demonstrates these effects is tax evasion by 
domestic help, such as housecleaners, babysitters, and yard-care 
workers. Tax evasion here may actually benefit the higher-income 
households hiring these services because the former can pay lower prices 
for the services of the latter. Three examples illustrate this point—one in 
                                                     
132. See James Alm & Hugo Lopez-Castaño, Payroll Taxes in Colombia, in FISCAL REFORM IN 
COLOMBIA—PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 191 (Richard M. Bird, James M. Poterba & Joel Slemrod 
eds., 2005). 
133. Id. 
134. In another case study for Tunisia, similar sectoral effects were found. See generally Alm, 
Analyzing and Reforming Tunisia’s Tax System, supra note 29. 
135. The first and still classic analysis is by Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax 
Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972). 
136. See generally James Alm & Keith Finlay, Who Benefits from Tax Evasion?, 43 ECON. 
ANALYSIS & POL’Y 139 (2013); Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Who Benefits from Tax Evasion? The 
Incidence of Tax Evasion, 1 PUB. ECON. REV. 105 (1996). 
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which there is equal negotiating power between the parties, another in 
which one of the two parties holds the upper hand, and still another more 
general “thought experiment.” 
First, suppose that a “service seeker” and a “service provider” are on 
equal footing in terms of negotiating power. Suppose further that a 
painter (the service provider) is willing to paint the home of an 
individual (the service seeker) for $10,000. If the painter were to report 
this income, assuming a forty percent tax rate, then she would net $6,000 
after taxes. The painter and the homeowner could negotiate a cash price 
in which the painter will instead accept $8,000, which is untaxed due to 
the nature of the cash transaction. This arrangement leaves both the 
painter and the homeowner $2,000 richer. It is, of course, the 
government that loses $4,000 of revenue. 
Second, suppose that the service seeker (e.g., a restaurant owner) has 
the upper hand in negotiating with the service provider (e.g., waiters) 
due to an excess supply of labor in the service market. Suppose that 
waiters who are “on the books” earn $15 per hour and pay forty percent 
tax on their earnings (netting $9 per hour). Suppose also that a restaurant 
owner can hire waiters “off the books” by paying them $9 per hour. In 
this situation, the waiter who receives cash does not benefit from being 
paid off the books. Rather, it is only the restaurant owner who benefits, 
pocketing the $6 difference between the “on the books” $15 per hour 
rate and the “off the books” $9 per hour rate. 
Third, suppose that in some previous year many service providers 
(e.g., plumbers) would traditionally offer service seekers (e.g., 
homeowners) two prices to install a new kitchen sink: $100 if paid in 
cash and $150 if paid with a check or credit card. Suppose further that, 
as a purchase incentive, many retail stores (e.g., Home Depot) now offer 
kitchen sink installations for a flat fee of $125, and that virtually all 
homeowners avail themselves of this convenience. On the basis of these 
assumptions, here are two tentative predictions. At least some plumbers 
would migrate to other labor markets because they are no longer able to 
misreport their plumbing transactions. Further, as a result of this labor 
movement away from the profession of plumbing, even those 
homeowners who sought to pay cash to command a lower price would 
nevertheless have to pay higher prices for the plumbing services 
rendered. These two predictions suggest that closing the tax gap would 
have important implications in at least some economic segments with 
respect to the overall labor market, labor compensation, and market 
prices. 
These three examples demonstrate how wages and prices are 
determined when the underground economy flourishes. More generally, 
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these examples suggest how wages and prices are affected when the 
existence of tax evasion leads to a tax gap. If cash were no longer used 
in the transactions, or if tax evasion were no longer a viable option, then 
there would be major impacts on product and factor prices, and thus on 
income distribution. 
A complete analysis of these distributional effects requires a detailed 
computational general equilibrium model of an economy, and the precise 
distributional effects will, of course, depend on the specific 
circumstances. Still, existing work suggests that the ultimate 
distributional effects may differ significantly from the effects that 
assume no general equilibrium adjustments; indeed, these studies 
indicate that taxpayers who successfully evade their tax liabilities often 
have a post-evasion welfare that is only marginally higher than their 
post-tax welfare if they had fully complied with the tax.
137
 Further, those 
taxpayers who evade their taxes retain only about three-fourths of their 
initial increase in welfare, while one-fourth of their initial gains 
disappear as a result of mobility that reflects competition and entry into 
the informal sector.
138
 Consequently, and consistent with the erosion of 
the initial benefits of tax evasion via general equilibrium adjustments, 
the evading taxpayers only marginally benefit from successful tax 
evasion; furthermore, this advantage diminishes with mobility via 
competition/entry in the informal sector, and at least some of the benefits 
of tax evasion are shifted to consumers and to other factors.
139
 
In a broad sense, general equilibrium calculations demonstrate that 
the gains from evasion are shifted at least in part from the evaders to the 
consumers of their output. These shifts occur via lower prices for goods 
and lower wages for services. Together, these price and wage shifts 
typically eliminate the incentive for workers to enter the untaxed sector. 
As more workers enter the untaxed sector, their production pushes down 
the relative price of the informal sector output and consequently the 
hourly returns; the movement of workers between the sectors also 
changes the relative productivity of workers in each sector as capital also 
moves between the sectors. In equilibrium, therefore, the marginal 
entrant to the untaxed sector has the gains from evading taxes offset by 
the relative price and productivity effects. If the existence of the tax gap 
generates these effects, then a declining tax gap will reverse them. 
                                                     
137. See Alm & Sennoga, supra note 131, at 1056. 
138. Id. at 1076–77, 1081. 
139. Id. at 1055–84; Kesselman, supra note 29, at 137–82; Philippe Thalmann, Factor Taxes and 
Evasion in General Equilibrium, 22 REG’L SCI. AND URB. ECON. 259–83 (1992). 
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B. Political Dimensions 
In recent decades, a common political refrain has been the claim that 
there is no need to raise taxes or to cut spending.
140
 Instead, politicians 
have often asserted that the nation may collect additional revenues 
simply through enhanced tax compliance.
141
 If the tax gap is truly 
closing, then this would have a monumental impact on political 
discourse of this nature. 
On a superficial level, the nature of political discourse itself would 
have to adjust. Politicians who have routinely signed “no new tax” 
pledges
142
 yet promised vast public infrastructure improvements funded 
with additional tax revenue would have to rethink their financing 
strategies. Put differently, the reliance in political debate upon what 
many politicians commonly believe to be, or at least describe as, “low 
hanging fruit” (e.g., closing the tax gap) would disappear. 
On a more substantive level, politicians would have to consider the 
need to raise additional revenue, enact budget cuts, or let the federal 
budget deficit grow. The existence of a large tax gap has always served a 
political convenience. The standard mantra has been something like this: 
                                                     
140. In the most famous of these declarations, in 1988 then-presidential candidate George H. W. 
Bush declared: “Read my lips: no new taxes.” Benjamin C. Ayers, C. Bryan Cloyd & John R. 
Robinson, “Read My Lips . . .”: Does the Tax Rhetoric of Presidential Candidates Affect Security 
Prices?, 48 J. L. & ECON. 125, 125 (2005). 
141. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., THE REPORT ON TAX REFORM 
OPTIONS: SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION 53–64 (2010), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Tax-Reform-Options-
2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5293-6J4V] (outlining compliance recommendations that would yield 
more tax revenue). To achieve this objective, some have said that the IRS must offer better taxpayer 
service. See 2007 TAX GAP STUDY, supra note 1, at 4 (“Service is especially important to help 
taxpayers avoid unintentional errors. Given the increasing complexity of the tax code, providing 
taxpayers with assistance and clear and accurate information before they file their tax returns 
reduces unnecessary post-filing contacts, allowing the IRS to focus enforcement resources on 
taxpayers who intentionally evade their tax obligations.”). Others have contended that a better-
funded IRS armed with stronger enforcement tools will galvanize more robust tax compliance. See 
TODER, supra note 88, at 1 (“For example, in the 1988 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate 
Michael Dukakis called for more tax enforcement as a means of reducing the budget deficit and 
cited his success in improving tax compliance in Massachusetts as a model of what might be 
accomplished at the federal level.”); Eric Katz, After Years of Cutting Funding, Republicans Seek to 
Privatize Part of the IRS, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (July 22, 2015), http://www.govexec.com/ 
management/2015/07/after-years-cutting-funding-republicans-seek-privatize-part-irs/118365/ [https: 
//perma.cc/FW7D-9QSQ] (“‘The real scandal around the IRS is that they have been so poorly 
funded that they cannot go after these folks who are deliberately avoiding tax payments,’ Obama 
said in an appearance on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart Tuesday evening.”). 
142. See Dominic Tierney, Grover Norquist and the Unbreakable Vow, ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/12/grover-norquist-and-the-unbreakable-
vow/266513/ [https://perma.cc/4GSS-W8RY]. 
04 - Alm & Soled.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/2017  1:30 PM 
554 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:521 
 
“We do not need to raise taxes to finance expenditures—we simply need 
to enforce the tax laws that are already on the books.” However, if the 
decline in the tax gap eliminated this option, then politicians would have 
to confront difficult political choices. Would they raise marginal tax 
rates? Would they cut their favorite spending program? Would they 
recommend more borrowing, including the associated higher debt limit? 
Politicians would now have to confront more realistic means of dealing 
with these and similar questions. 
Over the past several decades, the existence of the tax gap has served 
the needs of politicians on both sides of the political aisle: politicians on 
the left or on the right could advocate more spending financed by the 
“costless” method of eliminating the tax gap without incurring the wrath 
of groups like Americans for Tax Reform, which regard higher tax rates 
as a broken pledge.
143
 However, as the tax gap narrows, the political 
dynamics will change. If politicians want to extract additional revenue 
without the “free lunch” of the tax gap, they will have to rethink their 
approach, including changes in various administrative policies of the 
IRS, as discussed in the next section.
144
 
C. Administrative Dimensions 
For the past several decades, the IRS has endured constant scrutiny 
regarding its ability to monitor taxpayer compliance and to provide 
meaningful deterrence. This scrutiny has traditionally been measured by 
a simple metric: the percentage of audits that the agency was able to 
conduct.
145
 Based upon this metric, the IRS does not seem too adept. At 
least in the general public’s eyes, the agency has appeared to be faltering 
as audit levels have plummeted, hovering at historic lows.
146
 
                                                     
143. The website for Americans for Tax Reform considers low tax rates one of the most 
important features of an effective government and asks politicians to pledge their commitment to 
tax reductions. See AMERICANS FOR TAX REFORM, http://www.atr.org/ [https://perma.cc/PXW3-
DHJ9]. 
144. See TODER, supra note 88, at 20 (“Costs of closing the tax gap include IRS budgetary costs 
and compliance burdens on taxpayers and third parties. Decisions about increasing IRS enforcement 
and imposing additional requirements must balance expected improvements in compliance against 
these additional costs.”).  
145. See Woolley, supra note 35 (“For some filers or their tax preparers [because the anticipated 
2015 audit rate is projected to be so low], this all might seem like license to experiment with a more 
aggressive strategy.”). 
146. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2014 ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE RESULTS 
(May 2015), http://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/FY-2014%20Enforcement%20and%20Service%20 
Results%20—%20web%20version.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND4F-DEKG] (depicting a decline in the 
audit rate with an anemic 0.86% audit rate for 2014, its lowest rate in ten years). 
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It is hardly surprising that over the past decade the IRS has conducted 
fewer audits. The agency’s budget has either shrunk or stagnated, 
causing the number of IRS staff to dwindle.
147
 Simultaneously, the 
number of individual income (and other) tax returns keeps growing.
148
 In 
addition, the agency has been charged with a plethora of added 
responsibilities, including the task of implementing and overseeing the 
Affordable Care Act.
149
 
In theory, the nation appears poised to be beset with rampant taxpayer 
noncompliance as the IRS has been financially crippled and its duties 
greatly expanded. However, to date this has not happened. At least as 
evidenced by the prior tax gap studies, the percentage of noncompliant 
taxpayers has remained fairly constant.
150
 These findings are not 
surprising. Indeed, as evidenced by Part III of this analysis, the trend 
will likely be toward greater tax compliance as opportunities for 
noncompliance become fewer and farther between. 
Assuming the tax gap is narrowing, the implications for the IRS are 
vast. Consider the fact that conducting audits is resource intensive in 
nature. With less need to conduct audits, the agency’s resources would 
be liberated to achieve other objectives. In particular, rather than 
utilizing a sizable portion of its budget to conduct audits, the IRS could 
now concentrate its efforts on other pressing endeavors, including (1) the 
identification of unscrupulous tax return preparers, (2) the detection of 
identity theft perpetrators, and (3) the enhancement of IRS services to 
taxpayers. 
                                                     
147. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-151, TAX GAP: IRS COULD SIGNIFICANTLY 
INCREASE REVENUES BY BETTER TARGETING ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES 1 (2012), http://www. 
gao.gov/assets/660/650521.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5AK-6XU7]; Howard Gleckman, The War on the 
IRS: Congress Cuts Its Funding to the Lowest Level Since 1998, FORBES (Dec. 16, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2014/12/16/the-war-on-the-irs/ [https://perma.cc/GM4U-
QKAR] (“The massive 2015 spending bill that President Obama is likely to sign this week 
continues an ongoing effort to trash the Internal Revenue Service. It is a cynical recipe for a self-
fulfilling disaster: Give the agency more and more work. Cut its budget. Blame it for failing to do 
its job. Repeat.”). 
148. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 146 (showing that in eight of the last ten years, 
the number of individual income tax returns submitted has increased). 
149. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 1 FISCAL YEAR 2016 OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS 
38 (2015), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016-JRC/Area_of_ 
Focus_3_IRS_Administration_of_ACA.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN3Y-UM6R] (“Overall, the IRS has 
done a commendable job of implementing the first stages of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2009 (ACA), including developing or updating information technology systems, issuing 
guidance, and collaborating with other federal agencies.”). 
150. See TODER, supra note 88, at 6 (“With the caveat that estimates are very imprecise and the 
degrees of imprecision can change, we note that the measured tax gap has been quite stable over 
time in relation to ‘true’ tax liability.”).  
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1. Identification of Unscrupulous Tax Return Preparers 
Given the complexity of the tax system, tax return preparers often 
play a pivotal role in the tax return submission process,
151
 assisting 
taxpayers in the fulfillment of this critical civic duty. Some tax return 
preparers are highly trained professionals (e.g., certified public 
accountants and lawyers); if and when they act unscrupulously, they risk 
suspension or loss of their professional licenses. Unfortunately, 
however, most tax return preparers lack any formal training and have 
little downside risk if they are derelict in their duties.
152
 
By way of background, well over a century ago, Congress decided 
that the Department of the Treasury should be able to regulate taxpayer 
representatives who practice before the agency, enacting what has 
become known as Circular 230.
153
 Initially, this legislation enabled the 
Treasury Department to regulate “agents, attorneys, or other persons 
representing claimants before [the D]epartment.”154 
The enabling statute presently reads as follows: 
Subject to section 500 of title 5, the Secretary of the Treasury 
may— 
regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the 
Department of the Treasury; and 
                                                     
151. Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Regulating Tax Return Preparation, 57 B.C. L. 
REV. 151 (2017). 
152. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., MOST TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY A 
LIMITED SAMPLE OF UNENROLLED PREPARERS CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT ERRORS 14 (2008), 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2008reports/200840171fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/X72S-
2PWH]. (“Pursuing abusive preparers is part of the IRS’ strategy to reduce the tax gap, which 
researchers estimate to be $290 billion based on 2001 data.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-14-467T, PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, PREPARERS MADE 
SIGNIFICANT ERRORS (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662356.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6QZ-
VRQ4]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-563T, PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS: IN A 
LIMITED STUDY, CHAIN PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d06563t.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2BR-5UWF]; Nina E. Olson, More Than a ‘Mere’ Preparer: 
Loving and Return Preparation, 139 TAX NOTES 767, 767–68 (2013) (“[S]ignificant concerns have 
been raised about incompetent and unscrupulous preparers and their negative impact on taxpayers 
and tax compliance. If a preparer makes inflated claims that the IRS later rejects, or fails to claim 
benefits to which the taxpayer is entitled, the taxpayer suffers. If a preparer makes inflated claims 
that the IRS does not detect, federal revenue collection suffers.”). 
153. See Bryan T. Camp, ‘Loving’ Return Preparer Regulation, 72 TAX PRAC. 604, n.6 (2013) 
(noting that in 1921 the Treasury Department promulgated regulations (aka Circular 230) that 
sought to regulate tax practitioners, namely, attorneys and accountants, who practiced before the 
agency; “[t]he three basic regulatory efforts before 1921 were: Circular 13 (Feb. 6, 1886) 
(concerning internal taxes), Circular 94 (Oct. 4, 1890) (same), and T.D. 32974 (Nov. 30, 1912) 
(concerning Customs).”). 
154. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a), 23 Stat. 258 (1884) (original text). 
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before admitting a representative to practice, require that the 
representative demonstrate— 
good character; 
good reputation; 
necessary qualifications to enable the representative to provide 
to persons valuable service; and 
competency to advise and assist persons in presenting their 
cases.
155
 
Until 2011, the Department of the Treasury sought to regulate essentially 
four categories of tax professionals, namely, attorneys, certified public 
accountants, enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries.
156
 In 2011, 
however, the Treasury promulgated new regulations that sought to 
expand the category of those regulated to include all tax return preparers, 
mandating that they pass qualifying examinations and take continuing 
education classes.
157
 In two different cases—Loving v. Commissioner158 
and Ridgely v. Lew
159—judges rebuffed the IRS, invalidating these 
regulations. More specifically, in terms of preparing taxpayers’ returns, 
these two court decisions held that tax return preparers were neither 
“practicing” before the IRS160 nor functioning as taxpayers’ 
“representatives,”161 both of which are predicates under the enabling 
statute. 
For the time being, Congress does not seem inclined to pass 
legislation that will expand the scope of those regulated to include tax 
return preparers.
162
 That being the case, the IRS will be on its own to 
                                                     
155. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2012). 
156. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2016); see also JONATHAN G. BLATTMACHR, MITCHELL M. GANS & 
DAMIEN RIOS, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE CIRCULAR 230 DESKBOOK § 4:6 (2006). 
157. Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 76 Fed. Reg. 32,286 
(June 3, 2011). 
158. Loving v. IRS, 920 F. Supp. 2d. 108 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
159. 55 F. Supp. 3d. 89 (D.D.C. 2014). 
160. Loving, 742 F.3d at 1018 (“All of this underscores that tax-return preparers do not practice 
before the IRS when they simply assist in the preparation of someone else’s tax return.”); Ridgely, 
55 F. Supp. 3d at 95 (“[A] CPA hardly ‘practices’ before the IRS when he simply prepares and files 
a taxpayer’s refund claim, before being designated as the taxpayer’s representative and before the 
commencement of an audit or appeal.”).  
161. Loving, 742 F.3d at 1016 (“The term ‘representative’ is traditionally and commonly defined 
as an agent with authority to bind others, a description that does not fit tax-return preparers.”); 
Ridgely, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 95 (“Thus, Section 330’s use of the term ‘representative’ excludes refund 
claim preparers.”). 
162. Many bills were introduced to extend Treasury’s authority over tax return preparers, but all 
have been rejected in committee. See Taxpayer Protection and Preparer Fraud Prevention Act of 
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identify unscrupulous tax return preparers, of which there are apparently 
many.
163
 This identification exercise promises to be a resource-intensive 
task insofar as unscrupulous tax return preparers who lack a professional 
license do not commonly appear listed in any directory or telephone 
book or on any website; and they may not even register for a preparer 
taxpayer identification number (PTIN),
164
 making their shadowy 
existence and the identification process problematic and challenging. 
Even after the IRS identifies these unscrupulous tax return preparers, the 
agency’s tasks are far from over: the U.S. Justice Department must then 
be contacted to bring injunction actions against these actors.
165
 Unless 
the latter are imprisoned, they are apt to continue their practices; given 
this somewhat dire state of affairs, regulation of this industry by the IRS 
is entirely apropos and should be endorsed by Congress. 
2. Detection of Identity Theft Perpetrators 
Identity theft is a crime that largely did not exist until the turn of the 
twenty-first century. However, over the course of the last decade or 
so,
166
 particularly as the so-called Information Age has come into full 
                                                     
2013, H.R. 1570, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013); Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 6050, 112th 
Cong. § 202 (2012); Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2012, S. 3355, 112th Cong. § 202 (2012); 
Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2010, H.R. 5047, 111th Cong. § 202 (2010); Taxpayer Bill of Rights 
Act of 2010, S. 3215, 111th Cong. § 202 (2010); Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5716, 
110th Cong. § 4 (2008); Taxpayer Protection and Assistance Act of 2007, S. 1219, 110th Cong. § 4 
(2007); Telephone Excise Tax Repeal and Taxpayer Protection and Assistance Act of 2006, S. 
1321, 109th Cong. § 203 (2006); Taxpayer Protection and Assistance Act of 2005, S. 832, 109th 
Cong. § 4 (2005); Loving, 742 F.3d at 1020 (“[W]e find at least some significance in the fact that 
multiple Congresses have acted as if Section 330 did not extend so broadly as to cover tax return 
preparers.”).  
163. See supra note 152.  
164. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-336, TAX PREPARER REGULATION: IRS 
NEEDS A DOCUMENTED FRAMEWORK TO ACHIEVE GOAL OF IMPROVING TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 
(2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/317247.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZM5-KDYP]. 
165. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Court Permanently Shuts Down Iowa Tax 
Preparers (July 14, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-court-permanently-shuts-down-
iowa-tax-preparers [https://perma.cc/UQQ7-8B24]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, California 
Court Bars Four Men from Promoting Alleged Stock-Loan Tax Fraud Scheme (Sept. 15, 2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-tax-954.html [https://perma.cc/9K3B-WCFK] 
(noting that the Department of Justice obtained more than 425 tax-related injunctions from 2001 to 
2009).  
166. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, IDENTITY THEFT AND DATA SECURITY 1 (2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/identity-theft-and-data-security [https://perma.cc/ 
B5Q6-9RXL] (“Identity theft tops the list of consumer complaints that are reported to the FTC and 
other enforcement agencies every year.”). 
04 - Alm & Soled.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/2017  1:30 PM 
2017] W(H)ITHER THE TAX GAP? 559 
 
bloom, this crime has become rampant throughout the country, annually 
plaguing millions of people.
167
 
Identity theft comes in a variety of different forms. To achieve their 
objectives, perpetrators sometimes steal people’s mail and credit card 
information; other times, they phish on the internet to collect vital 
personal information.
168
 These criminals frequently seek taxpayers’ tax 
returns, which provide them with a treasure trove of information and 
which facilitate their ability to perpetrate identity theft.
169
 
In the sphere of tax refunds, identity theft is no small problem. The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the IRS 
prevented approximately $24.2 billion in stolen identity refund claims in 
2013.
170
 This was the good news. The bad news was that the IRS 
apparently sent out a stunning $5.8 billion in fraudulent refunds.
171
 This 
problem shows no signs of abating anytime soon.
172
 
In light of this crime epidemic, the IRS should forcefully respond. To 
date, the IRS has not sat idle as it has tried to strengthen its computer 
security systems, help victims, and pursue the criminals. This 
compliance effort has not come cheaply: the agency currently dedicates 
3,000 employees to combat this fraud.
173
 
Even so, more needs to be done, and a narrower tax gap would 
provide the IRS this opportunity. A narrower tax gap would give the IRS 
the ability to dedicate additional resources, as well as to reallocate 
                                                     
167. See ERIKA HARRELL & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY 
THEFT, 2012, at 1 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit12.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3G5-
42RK] (estimating the number of identity theft victims nationwide to be 16.6 million, or seven 
percent of all U.S. residents sixteen or older). 
168. See KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IDENTITY THEFT: TRENDS AND ISSUES 
(2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40599.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XU4-ZF7T].  
169. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-132T, IDENTITY THEFT: TOTAL 
EXTENT OF REFUND FRAUD USING STOLEN IDENTITIES IS UNKNOWN 2–3 (2012), http://www.gao. 
gov/assets/660/650365.pdf [https://perma.cc/SCP6-6ZK2]. 
170. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-119, IDENTIFY THEFT AND TAX FRAUD: 
ENHANCED AUTHENTICATION COULD COMBAT REFUND FRAUD, BUT IRS LACKS AN ESTIMATE OF 
COSTS, BENEFITS AND RISKS 11 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667965.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/W8M9-GVVX]. 
171. Id. 
172. See Michael S. Schmidt, Hacking of Tax Returns More Extensive Than First Reported, IRS 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/hacking-of-tax-
returns-more-extensive-than-first-reported-irs-says.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4VNZ-Q7F2] (“The 
Internal Revenue Service said Monday that hackers had gained access to the tax returns of more 
than 300,000 people, a far higher number than the agency had reported previously.”). 
173. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Combats Identify Theft and Refund Fraud on 
Many Fronts (Jan. 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Combats-Identity-Theft-and-
Refund-Fraud-on-Many-Fronts-2014 [https://perma.cc/92Q4-TZX8]. 
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existing resources, to the identity theft problem; thus, the IRS could 
redouble its efforts to improve its computer security systems and their 
ability to screen for fraud, to help taxpayers navigate the difficult plight 
of having their stolen refunds recovered, and to capture those who 
commit these acts. Such efforts on the agency’s part would hopefully 
rekindle renewed confidence in the entire tax system. 
3. IRS Service Enhancement 
Due to resource inadequacy and resource mismanagement, the IRS 
has fallen short of delivering adequate service to taxpayers. For example, 
phone lines to taxpayers are not being properly staffed, and written 
response times to taxpayers’ inquiries are reprehensible.174 As a whole, 
taxpayers have never relished dealing with the IRS; now, their worst 
fears are being realized. 
If the IRS did not have to devote a large portion of its limited 
resources to audit taxpayers’ tax returns, it could instead invest in 
improving taxpayer service.
175
 Direct improvements would include the 
dedication of additional employees to respond to taxpayers’ telephone 
and written inquiries. Moreover, additional funds could be used to better 
train IRS employees so that their responses would be more timely and 
accurate. Such improvements would vastly increase taxpayer 
                                                     
174. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-578T, TAX FILING: IRS NEEDS A 
COMPREHENSIVE CUSTOMER SERVICE STRATEGY AND NEEDS TO BETTER COMBAT IDENTITY THEFT 
REFUND FRAUD AND PROTECT TAXPAYER DATA (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676675.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KGR6-3P8B] (explaining why the IRS needs more funding to improve customer 
service); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 149, at 1 (“With funding down about 17 percent 
on an inflation-adjusted basis since FY 2010, and with the IRS having had to implement large 
portions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA) this year without any supplemental funding, sharp declines in taxpayer 
service were inevitable.” (citation omitted).); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 1 2014 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 3–25 (2014), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/ 
Documents/2014-Annual-Report/Volume-One.pdf [https://perma.cc/86JH-G44C] (“Most Serious 
Problem: Taxpayer Service: Taxpayer Service Has Reached Unacceptably Low Levels and Is 
Getting Worse, Creating Compliance Barriers and Significant Inconvenience for Millions of 
Taxpayers.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-156, 2012 TAX FILING: IRS FACES 
CHALLENGES PROVIDING SERVICE TO TAXPAYERS AND COULD COLLECT BALANCES DUE MORE 
EFFECTIVELY 2 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650962.pdf [https://perma.cc/4548-N5GE] 
(“However, IRS’s level of telephone service (the percentage of callers seeking live assistance who 
receive it) declined to 68 percent. In addition, of the 21 million pieces of paper correspondence IRS 
received, about 40 percent were considered overage (meaning that IRS did not respond within 45 
days of receipt), an increase compared to last year.”). 
175. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 147; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, IRS 2013 BUDGET: CONTINUING TO IMPROVE INFORMATION ON PROGRAM COSTS AND 
RESULTS COULD AID IN RESOURCE DECISION MAKING (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 
600/591463.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6XQ-PX2L]. 
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satisfaction, perhaps crystallizing in the form of higher taxpayer 
compliance. 
Better IRS service also extends to indirect improvements in how the 
agency functions. For example, additional resources would enable the 
IRS to modernize some of its antiquated technology systems, which are 
pivotal to limiting the number of false positives that the agency’s 
systems generate while simultaneously improving tax compliance. In 
particular, utilizing redirected funds, the IRS could accelerate the 
implementation of two important programs: the Reporting and 
Document Matching Program and the Return Review Program. The first 
program “is intended to be used to improve business taxpayer 
compliance by matching business information (e.g., 1099-K) tax returns 
with individual tax returns to identify potential income under 
reporting.”176 The second program “is expected to make use of leading-
edge technology to detect, resolve, and prevent fraud.”177 
A final agenda item that the IRS might seek to pursue with these 
redirected funds is the agency’s ability to offer prepared tax returns. 
Following the lead of California’s highly acclaimed and successful 
ReadyReturn Program
178
 (a program that prepares and distributes 
prepared state income tax returns on behalf of many low-income 
taxpayers who can then submit, modify, or reject them), the IRS could 
try to replicate the program at the national level.
179
 Were a program of 
                                                     
176. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-534R, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: 
ABSORBING BUDGET CUTS HAS RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT STAFFING DECLINES AND UNEVEN 
PERFORMANCE 21 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662681.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ5R-
TBYE]. 
177. Id.  
178. See Joseph Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens: The California ReadyReturn, 107 
TAX NOTES 1431 (2005) (highlighting California’s ReadyReturn pilot program).  
179. See William G. Gale, Remove the Return, in TOWARD TAX REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TASK FORCE 40, 41 (2009), http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/freefiles. 
nsf/Files/TowardTaxReform.pdf/$file/TowardTaxReform.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9XF-TALV] 
(“Fifth, and most important, the task force should recommend gradually moving an increasing 
number of people to a ‘return-free’ tax system. This could be either a fully return-free system, 
which would feature exact withholding, or, more likely, a tax agency reconciliation system, in 
which the IRS sends households a provisional tax return for confirmation or changes. These systems 
are feasible; they already exist in several developed countries. And a recent California experiment 
with a tax agency reconciliation system was successful and popular.”); HAMILTON PROJECT, THE 
SIMPLE RETURN: REDUCING AMERICA’S TAX BURDEN THROUGH RETURN FREE FILING 3 (2006), 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/The_Simple_Return-_Reducing 
_Americas_Tax_Burden_Through_Return-Free_Filing_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GW6-2FYF] 
(“With the Simple Return, the IRS would use the information about income that it already receives 
from employers and banks to send prefilled tax returns to taxpayers who have sufficiently simple 
finances. The program would be voluntary. Taxpayers who prefer to fill out their own tax forms or 
to pay a tax preparer to do it could use the Simple Return as the basis for their own calculations, or 
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this nature adopted, it would greatly alleviate the administrative burden 
that many taxpayers endure annually when preparing their own tax 
returns. 
*   *   * 
In sum, even in the face of a shrinking tax gap, the IRS would 
necessarily continue to monitor taxpayer compliance, retaining the 
agency’s important deterrent role. However, as the landscape around the 
IRS changes, the agency should adapt. If there are external factors that 
enhance tax compliance, the agency should redeploy its limited 
resources to areas of greater productivity. Three such areas of possible 
redeployment include the identification of unscrupulous tax return 
preparers, the detection of identity theft perpetrators, and the 
enhancement of IRS service to taxpayers. Although these areas of 
improvement are not targeted directly at enhancing taxpayer compliance, 
they would indirectly contribute to its amelioration. 
IV. COUNTERTRENDS THAT MAY INCREASE THE TAX GAP 
While the trends to curtail the tax gap are strong, if not inexorable, 
there are many potential obstacles on the immediate and not-too-distant 
time horizons that may impede the “withering” of the tax gap, making its 
“whithering” an open question.180 
Some obstacles are blatantly obvious. If Congress, for example, 
continues to reduce IRS funding, more taxpayers will likely join the 
ranks of the noncompliant.
181
 With virtually no downside risk, taxpayers 
must only confront their consciences, which may prove wholly 
inadequate to keep them on the tax compliance bandwagon. Other 
countries have poorly funded their taxing authorities, and they have 
                                                     
simply set it aside and file their taxes the conventional way.”); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON RETURN-FREE TAX SYSTEMS: TAX SIMPLIFICATION IS A 
PREREQUISITE 1 (2003), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/noreturn. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/5JEP-LHTR] (“The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring Act of 1998 
(P.L.105-206) calls for the Secretary of the Treasury to develop procedures for the implementation 
of a return-free system in the United States for ‘appropriate’ individuals by 2007.”). 
180. In the past, hiding cash or “forgetting” about an overseas account was fairly easy to 
effectuate and did not take much effort or engender much costly professional advice. The twenty-
first century tax noncompliance strategies that taxpayers may embark upon next will probably not 
share these same characteristics. Instead, these strategies are apt to be far more complex and require 
costly professional advice. The very existence of these frictions may dissuade even those taxpayers 
with a propensity to be derelict from their participation. 
181. See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.  
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found that the outcomes have proven abysmal.
182
 Governments can save 
on an immediate public expenditure by a reduction in administrative 
funding but often at a tremendous subsequent revenue cost. 
Other obstacles are less obvious. Advances in technology may 
actually increase the possibility for tax evasion. For example, Bitcoin 
and other forms of virtual currency may become more commonplace,
183
 
and the use of such devices as “zappers” may make evasion easier.184 
Indeed, it is impossible to predict how technology will evolve in the 
future, and currently unknown technologies may emerge to make tax 
evasion easier. Globalization and the associated factor mobility 
(especially capital mobility) may also mean that some forms of income 
are increasingly mobile and may more easily be masked.
185
 
Aside from obvious and not-so-obvious trends directly related to 
taxpayer compliance, there are political and cultural factors at play that 
may retard revenue collection. One of the foremost political factors is 
the presence of complicated tax laws, which can create supposed 
platforms of legal tax avoidance methods that sometimes morph into 
illegal tax evasion.
186
 Thus, there may be a decline in illegal tax evasion, 
but a corresponding increase in legal tax avoidance. The net impact of 
these trends on actual tax collections may well be offsetting. Relatedly, 
some current developments suggest noncompliance will remain a 
potential concern, such as the growth in partnerships and in self-
                                                     
182. See, e.g., Matthew Karnitschnig & Nektaria Stamouli, Greece Struggles to Get Citizens to 
Pay Their Taxes, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/greece-struggles-to-get-
citizens-to-pay-their-taxes-1424867495 [https://perma.cc/LH4Q-CPUW]. 
183. See Nathaniel Popper, Zcash, Less Traceable Than Bitcoin, Draws Investors, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 1, 2016, at B6 (“Speculators are snapping up a new virtual currency known as Zcash that was 
designed by university academics and built to be all but untraceable.”); see generally Thomas 
Slattery, Taking a Bit Out of Crime: Bitcoin and Cross-Border Tax Evasion, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L 
LAW 829 (2014); Sarah Gruber, Note, Trust, Identity, and Disclosure: Are Bitcoin Exchanges the 
Next Virtual Havens for Money Laundering and Tax Evasion?, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 135 (2013). 
184. See generally Ian Munroe, “Zapper” in Crosshairs as Taxman Targets High-Tech Tax 
Evasion, CBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/taxes/zapper-in-crosshairs-
as-taxman-targets-high-tech-tax-evasion-1.2498936 [https://perma.cc/DP4D-ERYV]. 
185. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the 
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2000) (“However, greater capital mobility and 
international tax competition allow investors to escape taxation easily by shifting capital to low- or 
no-tax jurisdictions.”); see also Arthur J. Cockfield, Big Data and Tax Haven Secrecy, 18 FLORIDA 
TAX REV. 483, 483 (2016) (“[P]olitical incentives persist that thwart cooperative efforts to inhibit 
global financial crimes.”). 
186. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 877, 
884 (2004) (“To be sure, creative compliance is facilitated because the tax law is exceedingly 
complex and open to alternative interpretations, and this undoubtedly facilitates ethical 
rationalizations of positions taken.”). 
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employed “contractors”;187 in both cases, the absence of third-party 
information reporting leaves open the possibility that those trends that 
diminish tax evasion may be overwhelmed by countervailing trends. 
Likewise, it is always possible that cultural concerns regarding the 
primacy of privacy, combined with fear of a powerful and intrusive 
government, will foil the IRS use of information storage, retrieval, and 
transmission upon which much of the success of a narrowing tax gap 
turns. The fact that so many people now seem so willing to share their 
most intimate information on social media platforms suggest that 
privacy concerns are not critical; however, it is always possible that, say, 
a massive breach of confidentiality that exposes many individuals to 
public shame could reverse these sentiments. 
To reiterate, the trends working to diminish the tax gap are vibrant. 
Even so, there are variables—some known and others not—that may 
counterbalance these trends. The jury in the form of time will tell; 
vigilance and patience are in order. 
CONCLUSION 
Intentionally or unintentionally, some taxpayers pay less than they 
owe in tax and, as a result, the tax gap will thus remain a permanent 
fixture of the tax system. Indeed, the incentives to cheat on one’s taxes 
are strong and abiding. Even so, there are compelling reasons to believe 
that several trends exist that will likely have a powerful impact in 
curtailing the tax gap’s size. These forces include the growing use of 
electronic methods to finance economic transactions, which helps 
generate a traceable trail of commerce; the expanding presence of third-
party compliance measures that take advantage of computer advances to 
monitor taxpayer economic activities; and the increasing concentration 
of economic activity in “large” business enterprises in which there is 
more direct and indirect tax compliance oversight. 
While there are many potential known obstacles and other unknown 
factors that may impede the withering of the tax gap, these appear to be 
relatively weak compared to the strong economic and technological 
trends that suggest the tax gap will soon be narrowing. If this analysis is 
                                                     
187. See Ron DeCarlo & Nina Shumofsky, Partnership Returns, 2013, STATISTICS OF INCOME 
BULLETIN (2015), https://www.irs.gov/PUP/taxstats/soi-a-copa-id1512.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZGJ9-
QHF4] (depicting a rapid increase in the number of partnership returns filed); Michael Cooper et al., 
Business in the United States: Who Owns It and How Much Tax Do They Pay (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21651, 2015) (“Partnership ownership is opaque: 20% of the 
income goes to unclassifiable partners, and 15% of the income is earned in circularly owned 
partnerships.”). 
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correct, then this systemic change associated the gradual closure of the 
tax gap has important public policy implications. These policy 
implications should not be ignored or shelved. Instead, Congress and the 
IRS can and should immediately act upon them. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1: 
Tax Gap and Voluntary Compliance Rate over Time
188
 
 
 
Figure 2:  
Tax Gap Map, 2008-2010 Annual Average 
                                                     
188. These data are drawn from various tax gap studies, primarily those listed on the IRS Tax 
Gap Website found at https://www.irs.gov/uac/irs-the-tax-gap [https://perma.cc/U9NB-FAXQ]. 
